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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In everyday life, people are confronted with a large amount of information. The
quality and utility of these pieces of information can vary greatly. Some information
may deliver useful and even important messages; other information may be nonsense
and even be meant to convince people of something untrue. The way people perceive
and react to di¤erent kinds of information is the focus of this thesis. Do people react
the way they should? Do these pieces of information give actual signals or are they
just noise? Do they provide people with some utility? The three essays presented
here explore how people perceive information that is given to them and how their
behaviors and satisfaction with their lives may change after receiving particular pieces
of information.
Chapter 2 is concerned with prices presented in stores. In particular, how people
react to a pre-promotion price (hereafter, PP price) displayed along with an actual
product price. We might assume that consumers only care about the price they
pay, as this is what actually matters for their wallet. In practice however, promo-
tions, discounts, and how o¤ers are framed also appear to be important to shoppers.
But why does a consumer care about an items non-discounted price? What does
this information convey to her? Price comparisons are mainly o¤ered to inuence
consumers and uniformed consumers may use these informational signals in forming
their perceptions of quality. Once consumers know the products quality, there is
no informative content in the high advertised price. Nevertheless, it may increase
consumersperceptions of savings and directly increase their utility.
To investigate the mechanisms in place and how displayed PP prices may impact
shoppersdecisions, I use data on the purchasing behaviors of numerous households
in the United States. Comparing informed with uninformed consumers allows me
to identify the di¤erent e¤ects of PP prices. In the empirical part of this essay,
I focus on disposable diaper purchases. Unlike most other products, I am able to
observe an individuals initial diaper purchase. People enter the market for diapers
because of an exogenous event: the birth of a child. Further, it can be assumed
that consumers have no knowledge about the quality of the product before their
rst purchase. Therefore, by looking at rst as well as subsequent purchases, I can
identify the informative e¤ect of a non-discounted price for uninformed consumers.
1
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I rst run a variety of quantity regressions instrumenting for the price and the
PP price. My results show that a high PP price has, in general, a positive impact
on the quantity purchased. However, it does not appear to increase the quantity
bought at the rst purchase by uninformed consumers. To investigate further, I
look at purchase probabilities in individual choice models. I nd that a high PP
price increases the purchase probability of uninformed consumers. This is consistent
with the idea that uninformed consumers use the PP price as a signal of quality as
this triggers their decisions to buy. Nevertheless, when they are unfamiliar with a
product, consumers try it in limited quantities.
This chapter is a rst step towards a better understanding of the PP prices
e¤ects. Uninformed consumers appear to rely on the hypothesis that price and
quality are linked. This idea convinces them to buy an unknown product by relying
on, among other characteristics, a higher PP price. Is it the "correct" way to behave?
Manufactures and retailers may be tempted to use this strategy and manipulate
prices. In particular, they may do so even if the quality-price relationship they
present does not reect the true one.
Chapter 31 focuses on how women react to a diagnosis of breast cancer most
probably a life-changing event. Medical treatment is unquestionably the principal
component in achieving remission or, ultimately, a cure. However, there is also lit-
erature on how lifestyle habits may have an impact on recovery probabilities and,
eventually, life expectancy. For example, it has been shown that alcohol consumption
is consistently found to be an independent risk factor for breast cancer. Smoking
seems to be less clearly related to the risk of developing breast cancer. Further,
obesity and weight gain are associated with increased risk for breast cancer (in post-
menopausal women), while physical activity may reduce the risk of death from the
disease. Numerous agencies spend time and money to investigate the causes of breast
cancer and to educate the public. However, little research has been undertaken to ex-
amine how risky health behaviors change when a woman receives information about
her chances of dying from breast cancer. How do women react to this information?
Do they follow the recommendations?
We track a panel of over 9,000 women in the United States over the period
1999 to 2011. These data allow us to observe changes in the womens behaviors; in
particular, changes following a breast cancer diagnosis. We develop a model where
women make lifestyle choices (how much to smoke, consume alcohol, and engage in
physical activity) in each period, and these lifestyle behaviors may be inuenced by
a breast cancer diagnosis. Estimating random e¤ects ordered probit models we nd
that whether an individual has been diagnosed with breast cancer has no signicant
impact on smoking behavior conditional on past behavior and demographic variables.
However, women who have had a more recent breast cancer diagnosis (less than ve
years ago) will signicantly decrease their smoking behavior. Further, we nd that
women do not change their alcohol consumption after a breast cancer diagnosis
regardless of when the diagnosis was made. Concerning physical activities, we nd
1This is a joint project with Michelle Sovinsky and Steven Stern.
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that a diagnosis of breast cancer signicantly impacts the amount women exercise in
a negative direction.
Finally, Chapter 42 looks at how a countrys advertising expenditures are related
to its inhabitantssatisfaction with their lives. Currently, people are confronted with
a great deal of advertising. Some billboards and advertisements may be informative;
some probably are not. Does all this information have some impact on peoples utility
and happiness? Looking at advertising expenditures in 27 European countries over
more than 30 years, we are able to link these expenditures with the reported life sat-
isfaction of approximately 1 million representative respondents. Running regressions
that include the usual control variables (such as age, gender, and macroeconomics)
as well as time and country xed e¤ects, we consistently nd a negative link between
advertising expenditures made by a country and the inhabitantsreported satisfac-
tion with their lives. This suggests that an overwhelming amount of advertising
may not benet people in their search for happiness. Indeed, this result is consistent
with the idea that advertising may stimulate endless desires that deteriorate peoples
sense of well-being.
While the three chapters of this thesis use di¤erent datasets and partially dif-
ferent methodologies, they all seek a better understanding of how people perceive
information and how it impacts their behaviors and levels of happiness. The nd-
ings in these chapters encourage discussion about the way consumers, patients, and
inhabitants react to the information they receive.
2This is a joint project with Michelle Sovinsky, Eugenio Proto, and Andrew Oswald.

Chapter 2
What Does This Discount Tell
You? Investigating the Impact of
Pre-Promotion Price E¤ects
2.1 Introduction
What does a 50% discount tell buyers? Armstrong and Chen (2013) propose di¤erent
theoretical models that could explain why consumers might care about receiving a
deliberate discount [...], as opposed simply to obtaining a low price.I consider prod-
ucts that are on promotion and the e¤ects that the pre-promotion price (hereafter,
PP price) have on purchase behaviors. I focus on experience goods. A product is
considered to be an experience good when its characteristics such as its quality
are di¢ cult to know in advance but can be determined upon consumption (Nelson,
1970). Consuming a product is, therefore, a way to learn the products true quality.
Other external clues can be used to infer quality when a consumer does not know
a product. Advertisements, reviews, and prices of the product are examples of such
signals. The underlying idea is that people believe these signals are related to the
quality of the product in some way. While using the product gives them a direct
signal about its true quality, these other signals provide indirect information about
its quality. Depending on the product and the environment, the consumer may need
to consume the product many times before knowing its true quality perfectly. In
other cases, its quality may be learned after only one trial. Once the product is
consumed and its quality revealed, the individual no longer needs quality clues.
Along with a products actual selling price, retailers frequently display a higher,
advertised reference price. These price comparisons are o¤ered to inuence con-
sumers who use these informational signals in forming their perceptions of quality.
When consumers know the products quality, these strategies are used to increase
consumersperceptions of savings (Grewal and Compeau, 2007). In this paper, I
am specically interested in the e¤ects of PP prices. While the literature on price
e¤ect is vast and multifaceted, discount pricing itself has not received much economic
5
CHAPTER 2. WHAT DOES THIS DISCOUNT TELL YOU? 6
analysis (Armstrong and Chen, 2013). My paper lls a gap by shedding light on the
role of the PP price in the context of discounted prices.
In my empirical analysis, I distinguish the di¤erent e¤ects of PP prices on con-
sumersbehaviors as well as the underlying mechanisms. To do so, I focus on dis-
posable diaper purchases. Unlike most products, people enter the market for diapers
because of an exogenous event the birth of a child. This provides two advantages:
First, I am able to observe an individuals initial purchase; second, the individual can
be considered to have no knowledge about the quality of the products o¤ered before
this event.1 I use rich scanner panel data and am able to follow the same individuals
making their rst and subsequent purchases. Therefore, I have observations from
uninformed as well as informed consumers. While the uninformed consumers may
use the PP as a signal of quality, the signaling e¤ect disappears once the quality is
known. However, even informed consumers may derive some extra utility from get-
ting a good deal. Comparing the price paid with the PP price could increase their
utility as it provides them with a positive transaction value (i.e., a deal)(Grewal
et al., 1998).
In my model, consumers are assumed to know the quality of the product after
one trial (one-period learning). I identify the signaling e¤ect of the PP price by
looking only at rst purchases when the product is on promotion. I am interested to
see how this PP price inuences the quantity people buy and their buying decisions.
To do this, I run di¤erent quantity regressions instrumenting for the price and the
PP and estimate individual choice models. My results show that the PP price is
taken as a signal of quality by uninformed consumers and increases their purchase
probability. However, it does not increase the quantity bought the rst time. The PP
price appears to have a general positive e¤ect in the quantity regression on informed
consumers but no clear e¤ect in the individual choice model.
This research is a rst step towards a better understanding of the PP prices e¤ects
and underlying mechanisms. My ndings can be useful for retailers or manufacturers
hoping to approach and convince uninformed consumers.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the related lit-
erature. Section 2.3 displays a learning model providing an idea of the mechanisms
through which signaling and price e¤ects may operate. Section 2.4 presents the
dataset used, the patterns that can be found within it, and an explanation of how
some variables of interest are constructed. Section 2.5 presents results estimations
and, nally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Di¤erent theoretical explanations exist to justify why a discounted price and not
simply a low price can increase a rational consumers willingness to buy a product
1This is particularly true for a persons rst child. People who already have one child already
have prior experience with diapers. However, that experience can be considered as too old and not
pertinent for the current market (Ching et al, 2014).
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(Armstrong and Chen, 2013). One explanation is that the original value of a product
gives some information about the products quality. This must be particularly true
when consumers use a product for the rst time. A vast amount of literature exists
about the relationship between price and perceived quality (Rao, 2005). There is
less understanding concerning the possible distortion that discounts could cause to
this positive price/quality correlation (Palazon and Delgado-Ballester, 2009). Rao
and Sattler (2003) mention that price has two distinct roles when consumers evalu-
ate the possible alternatives: the informational role (signal) and the allocative role
(constraint). They analyze these e¤ects in an experiment with students by varying
the individualsbudget constraints. Their ndings show that the informative e¤ect
is positive while the allocative e¤ect is negative. However, in their setting they are
not able to distinguish whether this is due to a quality e¤ect or a taste for bargains.
Mastrobuoni et al. (2014) also use experimental data to disentangle signaling and
budgetary e¤ects of price on wine demand. They present a demand model where
quality is not perfectly observable and prices have a non-budgetary e¤ect on demand
through their signaling value. They nd evidence for a signaling e¤ect that appears
to be of greater importance to inexperienced consumers. However, their ndings rely
on hypothetical decisions and not actual purchases.
Most of the literature on price signaling quality focuses on price paid incorporat-
ing a signal of quality. However, little is known about the impact of the PP price
in the case of discounts. Do people care about the PP price, or solely about the
price paid? As mentioned, consumers may use prices to infer unobservable prod-
uct quality. When an external reference price such as the PP price is present, the
price paid may play a lesser role (Panzone, 2014). In their synthesis of research
on consumer responses to price, Grewal and Compeau (2007) note that research in
the eld of advertised price and signals has not focused on how these cues a¤ect
quality perceptions.Darke and Chung (2005) posit that consumers may actually
use the lower selling price rather than the original, or PP price, to infer quality.2
Discounts are often o¤ered for products for which consumers do not have very much
information. For example, they are used to sell generic goods, and to introduce a
new product or a new brand. In these situations, individuals are more prone to infer
some price/quality relationship (Darke and Chung, 2005).
A promotion can give two signals to consumers: The high initial price could in-
crease quality perceptions while the low selling price might decrease them (Darke
and Chung, 2005). In a series of small experiments, Darke and Chung (2005) found
that discounts give rise to some negative quality inferences especially when people
have doubts about a products quality. Using laboratory experiments on experience
goods3 in the service sector, Raghubir and Corfman (1999) nd that, in some par-
ticular cases, consumers associate promotions with lower product quality. This is
particularly true if the consumers do not have experience with the product. With
2In this work, I use the term pre-promotion price PP price for the price before any discount.
This can also be understood as the original price of a product.
3As previously dened, a product is considered to be an experience good when its characteristics
are di¢ cult to know in advance, but can be determined upon consumption (Nelson, 1970).
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a greater amount of information from other sources, the e¤ect of price on perceived
quality will be smaller (Rao and Monroe, 1988). Not every discount has the same
impact. For example, Raghubir and Corfman (1999) nd from an in-class experiment
that a discount o¤ered on a brand name has more e¤ect on consumerspurchase in-
tentions than a similar discount on a store brand. The believability of the advertised
retail price has importance. It may well be that the higher the [advertised reference
price], the lower the believability of the o¤er(Delvin et al., 2013). This is related
to the idea that people may discount the discounts (Gupta and Cooper, 1992).
All these ndings come from lab and web experiments and do not consider actual
purchases decisions.
The literature concerned with disentangling the mechanisms of price e¤ects fo-
cuses on dynamic learning processes. Consumers learn from price (and possibly
other aspects) and update their beliefs about quality (see, for example, Erdem et
al., 2008).4 Learning models make the assumption that individuals have incomplete
information about product characteristics. To make their purchase choices, they rely
on what they observe: the products perceived attributes (Ching et al., 2013). Over
time, they derive informational cues that help them learn more about products. The
information can come through di¤erent channels. Trials (or experience) might be
the only source of learning. However, external sources can come into play as well,
such as advertising, newspapers, promotions, price, reviews, and ratings.
The work of Erdem and Keane (1996) is often viewed as the basis and the unify-
ing framework for subsequent models (Ching et al., 2013). In the Erdem and Keane
model (1996), consumers acquire brand quality signals via use experience and ad-
vertising. The perceived quality of a brand is a weighted average of individuals
initial beliefs as well as all the quality signals they received previously. Over time,
some consumers receive better quality signals than others. The work of Erdem et
al. (2008) builds on the Erdem and Keane model (1996) by adding more external
signals. In particular, in their model consumers can learn product quality through
price, advertising frequency, advertising content, and use experience. For price to be
a signal, it is assumed that there is some price/quality relationship. Consumers have
prior ideas about mean price and quality and update these beliefs using Bayesian
rules. For example, using data on ketchup, they nd that price can be considered to
be an important quality signal. They posit that people always use the price paid as
a signal of quality even if the product is on promotion. Therefore, frequent price
cuts can have a negative impact on brand reputations.
In a similar Bayesian learning framework, Ackerberg (2003) looks at the dual role
of advertisements. When consumers have not yet experienced a product, advertising
can be directly informative about the products characteristics. Advertising can also
be persuasive and directly impact a consumers utility without necessarily providing
any clear information (Mehta et al., 2008). This persuasive e¤ect occurs even when
buyers have full information about the product.
Ching et al. (2014) present a model where learning, inventory, and category
4Ching et al. (2013) present a good overview of the literature.
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considerations come into play. The learning aspect is similar to Erdem and Keane
(1996), in which consumers have uncertainty about product quality and use trials and
advertisements as signals to infer quality. Using the category consideration model
(developed in Ching et al., 2009), they do not assume that consumers examine prices
in every period. Rather, there is a two-stage process: In the rst stage, consumers
decide whether or not to consider a particular product category. In the second stage
which happens only if they do consider the category consumers make their choices.
In their empirical application to diapers, Ching et al. (2014) nd that learning,
inventory, and category consideration e¤ects are important and drive consumers
choices. None of these papers on learning models include the possible direct e¤ect of
PP price.
Consumers may further display reference dependence preferences (as rst pro-
posed by Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). A reference price can be considered as
the norm against which people compare and judge the current purchase price of an
item (Mazumdar et al., 2005). When the price people must pay is higher than their
reference price they may su¤er some disutility. When the price presented is lower
than their reference point, it could increase their willingness to buy. This is related
to the idea that some people are intrinsically attracted to discounts. They obtain
direct utility from buying a reduced-priced item. Similar to the transaction utility
theory developed by Thaler (1985), the act of making a good deal gives extra utility
to the consumer (Grewal and Compeau, 2007). There are, for the most part, two
broad reference price concepts (Mazumda et al., 2005): the internal reference price
(IRP), which is a memory-based concept; and the external reference price (ERP),
which is based on external stimuli. According to Mazumda et al. (2005), the main
determinant of a consumers IRP for frequently purchased packaged goods is the
previous price she has observed. Additionally, the more recently the previous pur-
chase occurred, the larger the e¤ect (Mazumda et al., 2005). On the other hand,
some people may not rely on past prices but solely consider external stimuli that
arise during the purchase occasion. The recommended retail price or the advertised
reference price can be considered to be such stimuli.
Mazumdar and Papatla (2000) propose a model where consumers use both an IRP
as well as an ERP, but one may be more salient than the other. They emphasize
that, usually, there is more than one type of consumer and that the type of prod-
uct also matters. People tend to use ERP rather than IRP for product categories
where promotions are frequent or for those with longer times between purchases.
Moreover, the use of an IRP is greater for more costly categories than for cheaper
ones. Consumers are, of course, not all the same, and heterogeneity in consumer
price responsiveness may also play a role (Bell and Lattin, 2000).
Di¤erent theories explain how and why IRP e¤ects arise. Erdem et al. (2010)
present a test to di¤erentiate between the two principal versions: price used as a
signal of quality and used as a predictor of future prices. Their test is based on
variations of how past purchases interact with IRPs. They use data on ketchup and
diapers and nd that when consumersexperience increases, the reference-price e¤ect
decreases. Consumers in their setting do not derive any extra utility from the fact
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that a product is discounted.
In my empirical analysis, I focus on diaper purchases. The market for diapers and
its consumers have particular features of note. Demand for diapers is stable and, to
a great extent, not related to macroeconomic conditions (Haucap et al, 2013). Since
parents buy diapers often, a relatively large number of purchases can be observed
(Ching et al., 2014). They appear to be quality-sensitive customers and care about
the quality of the product (Haucap et al, 2013). In this category, a consumer begins
buying due to an exogenous event, namely the birth of a child. In most other product
categories  for example, the laundry detergent or cereal category consumers have
been in the market for a long time (Ching et al., 2014) and it is, therefore, di¢ cult
to observe a rst purchase.
As explained, the literature on the price e¤ect is vast and multifaceted. However,
discount pricing itself has not received much economic analysis (Armstrong and Chen,
2013). In the context of discounted price, my paper lls a gap in the literature by
shedding light on the role of the PP price by looking at its e¤ect and understanding
why people react as they do.
2.3 Theory Model
In this section, I present a learning model to motivate the mechanisms through
which price e¤ects might operate. The learning process relies on Bayesian updating.
However, as has been noted in the literature, sizable empirical evidence documents
systematic violations ofupdating based on Bayesrule (Ortoleva, 2012). Neverthe-
less, this framework remains a good way to introduce my identication strategy and
to understand the mechanisms that may play a role. A more general model with
various details can be found in Appendix 2.6.
Consumer i does her shopping in period t and faces products j = 1; :::; J . The
price paid is denoted pijt. The discount (if any) is denoted by dit and the price
without discount the PP price is denoted by Pijt. Thus Pijt = pijt + dijt. If
there is no discount, the price paid is equal to the PP price. This PP price serves
as a signal of quality for consumers5 and they use it when making inferences about
quality.6 The good considered is an experience good and is assumed to be nondurable
enough that it is consumed/used before the next purchase (as in Ackerberg, 2003).
In a given period, consumers observe prices of all the products available, as well
as the corresponding discounts, and decide to purchase one of the products or the
outside alternative.
Following Erdem et al. (2008), I assume the following form for the utility function:
Uijt = ipijt + iQ
E
ijt + iri
 
QEijt
2
+ idijt + eijt; (2.1)
5This is not like Erdem et al., 2008 who assume that the price signal always comes from the
price paid.
6That is, when a product is presented as 50USD instead of 100USD, it is assumed that people
use 100USD to infer quality rather than 50USD.
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where pijt is the price paid by the consumer for this product, QEijt is the experience
quality(Erdem et al., 2008) or experience utility(Ackerberg, 2003), ri represents
the consumers risk aversion towards variations in quality, dijt is the discount (if any),
and eijt is a taste shock known to the consumer but not to the econometrician.
Experience quality, QEijt, is the measure of the utility that consumer derives from
product characteristics that are not directly observable to her. It is not known before
the purchase and the QEijt might, for example, represent the length of time before
the rst leak from the diaper. Once the good is purchased and used, QEijt is revealed.
The simplest case is the one-period learning process where QEijt is constant for all
future periods. After one purchase, the consumer knows the experience utility for
all future t. The general way of writing the learning process is
QEijt = Qj + ijt where ijt  N(0; 2).
Qj is the true quality of the product, but consumers do not experience it directly as
a users experience is context dependent (Erdem et al., 2008). The ijt are referred
to as the experience variabilities and are not distinguishable from the mean.
Before any experience in the market, at t = 0, individuals have some prior beliefs
about the mean prices and the mean experience quality level of products. Over time,
the use experience gives households signals about quality (Erdem and Keane, 1996).
In addition, people use the price as a signal of quality. It is assumed that the PP
prices observed by the consumers, Pijt, follow the process
Pijt = Pj + !ijt; !ijt  N(0; 2!); (2.2)
where Pj is the mean PP price. Deviations around the mean Pj exist because some
consumers may not see the PP price posted during a promotion, or there may be
some variation in where and when the PP price is posted. Consumers believe that
this mean price is related to the product quality as follows (Erdem et al., 2008)
Pj = 0 + 1Qj + j; (2.3)
where Qj is the products true quality and consumers perceive that the j are
distributed according to j  N(0; 2). Consumers use the observed Pijt to learn
about Pj.
Both signals use experience and PP price impact the perceived quality of the
product. The whole process can be written as a combination of initial priors at t = 0,
the learning process, and consumers updated beliefs about the product j after a
history of observed PP prices and use experiences (Ackerberg, 2003; DeGroot, 1970).7
The consumer derives information on true brand quality Qj through PP price, as
well as usage. However, while buying and using the product gives direct information
on Qj, the PP price only provides indirect information through the consumers prior
beliefs that PP price and true quality are correlated (equation (2.3)). The more
7Details to the formulas can be found in 2.6.
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direct information the consumer gains via using the product, the less she needs
indirect information through the PP price. Therefore, all else being equal, the more
usage experience an individual has, the less information will be in the PP price signal
and the less it will impact her expected utility function.
In a one-usage learning model (where true quality is learned after only one use),
the PP price will have no impact on a consumer after she has bought and used the
product once (Ackerberg, 2003). However, the PP price may impact a consumer
directly via the discount, idijt, as seen in equation (2.1). While the signaling e¤ect
of the PP price solely impacts uninformed consumers, the direct e¤ect of a high PP
price also impacts persons with experience.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Description of the Dataset
I use data from the Nielsen Company, provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing
Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.8 The data
are for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and the markets of Chicago and Atlanta in
the United States. Both a consumer panel dataset and a retailer scanner dataset
are available. The consumer panel dataset is a longitudinal survey with annual
updates. Panelists use in-home scanners to record their purchases from any outlet.
The retailers are from any US market, and panelists are geographically dispersed.
The dataset contains information about price and product characteristics as well as
other purchase information for a large number of food and non-food items. The
retail scanner dataset contains weekly prices as well as volume and merchandising
conditions from participating retail stores in the markets.
Following the literature on learning models, I focus on disposable diapers.9 In this
product category, quality is an important factor no one wants to experiment with
leaking diapers and people care about the objective attributes of the product. As
mentioned in Erdem et al. (2010), diapers are a good example of a product for which
price plays a relevant role as a signal of quality. The usage cycle of diapers is also
shorter than for other quasi-durable goods (Ching et al, 2014) and this provides more
observations. Moreover, as noted in Kumar and Leone (1988), stockpiling of this
product is uncommon because of the high price and general bulkiness of the box.
Diapers are also considered to be in the low stockpiling category by Bronnenberg et al.
(2008). Another advantage of diapers for my study is that people usually start buying
diapers only after they have children. This is an exogenous event and, therefore, the
initial purchase (which is often missing for other product categories) can be observed
(Ching et al., 2010). Further, this category is dominated by four leading brands
(Erdem et al., 2010; Ching et al., 2014): Pampers, Huggies, LUVS, and the generic
8For information on availability and access to the data, see
http://research.chicagobooth.edu/nielsen.
9I restrict the data to diapers, drop training pants, and other underwear for older children.
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Figure 2.1: Market Shares of the Four Leading Brands and the OtherBrand, by
Year
store brands (labeled Generic or Private Label Brand). Figure 2.1 illustrates
the market shares of the four leading brands in the three years considered.
My initial sample consists of 827 households who buy diapers and have children.
Several households must be dropped from the analysis based on their purchasing
proles. First, I exclude households that make three or fewer purchases over the
sample period (548 households dropped). This exclusion is necessary to have enough
data points for the individual choice model. It is important to have observations on
purchases made with and without experience to identify the di¤erent e¤ects. Further,
I drop households that make between four and seven purchase trips and include no
children under 6 years old (65 households dropped). This exclusion is specic to the
diaper category and is made because it seems that these people are buying diapers
for others (Erdem et al., 2010).10 In addition, concerning the choices made, I drop
observations from households who do not buy diapers from the four main brands.
Similarly, I exclude the purchase observations when a household chooses multiple
brands during one shopping trip (Erdem et al., 2010).11 My nal sample consists
of 214 households who choose at most one brand at each purchase occasion. On
average, I observe 13.7 diaper purchases per household, which leads to a total of
2938 purchases observed.
My unit of observation is dened at the week t level. There are few households
that make more than one purchase during one week. For these, I aggregate their
multiple purchases into one single purchase.
10They could be grandparents or other relatives who intermittently buy diapers for the childs
parents or to have at home for when the child visits. As they do not regularly live with the child
(no children under 6 live in their households), they do not have a true experience with the products
quality.
11A household may buy di¤erent products, but they are mostly from the same brand. Less than
6% of the observations come from multiple brands purchased during one trip.
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I identify households making their rst purchase in the diaper market as those
who took a long time before making a purchase in the time period (Erdem et al.,
2010) and then purchase regularly. In particular, a households purchase at time t1
is considered to be the rst ever if
t1 > max
j=1;:::;N 1
ftj+1   tjg,
where N   1 is the second-to-last period in the sample. This means that the rst
inter-purchase spell is longer than any subsequent inter-purchase spell (Ching et
al. 2014). The rst inter-purchase spell is calculated with respect to the start of my
sample: January 1, 2011. However, I may miss new parents who buy for the rst time
at the beginning of 2011 and for which the rst spell is automatically small. To avoid
that, I also consider a household as a rst buyer if this household was present in the
panelists of 2010 but did not buy any diapers in that year (i.e., their rst purchase
of diapers is in 2011).12 For 44% of my observations, the rst diaper purchase takes
place during the sample period. Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of my
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for my Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Live in Chicago 0.654 0.476
Ethnicity of the Household
Caucasian 0.652 0.477
African American 0.196 0.397
Other 0.153 0.36
Composition of the Household
Size of the Household 3.622 1.407
Number of Children 1.456 1.287
Married Couple 0.879 0.326
Highest Education Grade
Grade School 0.006 0.075
High School 0.267 0.443
College 0.477 0.500
Post College 0.250 0.433
Earnings
Total Income < $30,000 0.072 0.258
$30,000  Total Income < $50,000 0.159 0.366
$50,000  Total Income < $100,000 0.458 0.498
Total Income  $100,000 0.311 0.463
Number of Household-Week 2270
Age of the Female
Under 40 0.562 0.496
Between 40 and 49 0.256 0.437
50 and Older 0.182 0.386
Number of Household-Week 2234
Age of the Male
Under 40 0.457 0.498
Between 40 and 49 0.335 0.472
50 and Older 0.208 0.406
Number of Household-Week 2053
Notes: Children are dened as being younger than 18 years old.
Calculations are based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
sample. As it can be seen, the majority of the households are located in the Chicago
12People who have multiple children with a long gap between each of them could also be considered
as rst buyers with this denition. These households are, therefore, not making their very rst
purchase. However, their past experience can be considered as too old to be really relevant in the
current market (Ching et al. 2014).
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area (65%) and are Caucasian (65%). On average, a household consists of a married
couple (88%) and of 1 to 2 children (1:5). The ages of the female and male heads are
reported in the bottom panel of Table 2.1. For both categories, it can be seen that
the largest group of respondents are people younger than 40 years old.
The price of a product is an important characteristic. Not only the price paid
by a consumer, but also past prices as well as prices a consumer sees when she goes
to the store, even if she does not buy anything. In an ideal world, I would have
su¢ cient information about each specic product and each price in each period.
However, this is not the case. The consumer dataset only contains prices (and
product characteristics) for actual purchases by panelists. I can rely on the retail
dataset to complete some price information but there are two main caveats. First,
the retail dataset only covers a subsample of the stores; second, every detail is masked
(for privacy reasons) for products from a generic store brand. These products only
can be matched imperfectly with the consumer panel dataset. As mentioned above,
the private brand represents a non-negligible part of the disposable diaper industry.
It is not possible to construct an exact price history for each Universal Product
Code (UPC). Therefore, I follow the literature and focus on brand choices (Mayhew
and Winer, 1992, Erdem et al., 2008, Erdem et al., 2010). For diapers, as noted
in Erdem et al. (2010) and Ching et al. (2014), this is not trivial because each
brand o¤ers a large number of di¤erent product sizes and package sizes. I dene
my product as a brand /diaper size combination for each store. I rst aggregate
each brands diaper sizes into four di¤erent categories, from diapers for newborns to
diapers for infants weighing more than 15kg. A price index is constructed for each
diaper sizebrandstoreweek(as in Erdem et al, 2010).
This price index is designed by using a weighted average of prices for di¤erent
package sizes. These weights reect the relative quantity sold of each package size.
For example, consider diaper size 3. For this diaper category, let us say that Pampers
o¤ers four di¤erent package sizes. Each of these package sizes sells a specic amount
and this corresponds to a certain market share (in quantity terms) within the brand
(calculated by city and for the entire sample length), say 1
2
, 1
10
, 1
5
and 1
5
. I rst
calculate a simple average price for each of these four package sizes in each store
week (denoted p1, p2, p3 and p4). The Pampersprice index for a specic diaper size,
in a specic store, in a specic city, will be a share weighted average of these mean
prices, that is 1
2
p1+
1
10
p2+
1
5
p3+
1
5
p4.
13
There is a total of 1; 710 di¤erent storebranddiaper size combinations for
156 weeks, which corresponds to a total of 266; 760 observations. A relatively large
part of these observations are missing. For them, I follow the literature (Erdem et
al. 2010, Ching et al. 2014) and replace the price index by average prices o¤ered in
the same market (Chicago or Atlanta) for the same diaper sizebrand.14 For the
13In practice, this is slightly more subtle because not every store sells all existing package sizes
every week. Thus, I use the weights but corrected for whether I have information for this store for
this package in this week.
14At rst, 85% of the 266; 760 observations are missing. After lling the prices with market prices,
42; 605 (16%) observations are still missing.
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remaining missing values, I extrapolate the price index from t  1 and t+ 1. If both
price indexes are available, I use an average of both; if only one is available, I use
that one.15
In order to use the price index in the consumer choice decision, I transform it into
a unit price index. Therefore, I do not consider quantity discounts. In my sample, I
have data on an average of 2:4 di¤erent products by store.16
Figure 2.2 presents the average unit price index for all four brands by diaper size.
It shows that Pampers and Huggies have a higher average price index, while the
private label and LUVS are the cheapest brands.
Figure 2.2: Unit Price Index by Diaper Size and Brand
The data do not contain one general indicator of temporary price reductions.
In the consumer panel data, there is a perceived as a deal variable but this is
unfortunately not enough for the whole price index process. Following Nielsens
recommendation and the literature, I dene a price reduction by comparing actual
prices to historical prices. In particular, I dene a sale as any price at least 5 percent
below the modal price(Hendel and Nevo, 2006). Figure 2.3 shows this indicator for
a particular brand.
Table 2.2 presents some descriptive statistics of the unit price averaged by diaper
size for each brand. As expected, the private label has, overall, the lowest unit price
index while Huggies is the most expensive brand.
15Twenty-ve percent of the missing values could be lled with this extrapolation. For the rest
(where no prices were available either in t+ 1 or in t  1), I look at the two periods prior and use
these price indexes.
16The number of products by store ranges from one to 14.
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Figure 2.3: Price Index and On SaleIndicator
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Market Unit Price Promotion
Brand Share Index Frequency
Pamper 0.337 0.290 0.166
Huggies 0.303 0.320 0.143
Luvs 0.062 0.193 0.272
Private Label 0.298 0.183 0.344
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
and marketing databases.
2.4.2 Preliminary Analysis
Figure 2.4 shows that there is variation in household purchase decisions. In this
example, household 1 appears to only choose the private label brand while household
2 switches between brands. Figure 2.5 shows three households with di¤erent purchase
preferences. Household 1 purchases diapers at a non-discounted price, household 2
almost solely buys diapers that are on sale, while household 3 appears to like both.17
Table 2.3 presents mean statistics for consumers who are newer to the market
(for whom I observe their rst purchase) as well as for those who have been present
in the market for a longer time, facing a price on promotion or not. The size of the
household is larger for experienced consumers, which makes sense as some of them
have more than one child. New consumers appear to be poorer than experienced
consumers. When the price is on promotion, new consumers more often choose
Pampers, while experienced consumers buy Huggies the majority of the time. The
private label brand is chosen most of the time when there is no promotion.
17For each of these three households I have more than 20 observations points.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of Brand Choices for Two Households
Figure 2.5: Comparison of Purchases when Price is on Promotion or Not for Three
Households
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Table 2.3: Experimented and Less Experimented Consumers Facing Prices on Pro-
motion or Not
Less Experimented Consumers Experimented Consumers
Promotion No Promotion Promotion No Promotion
Ethnicity of the Household
Caucasian 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.65
African American 0.13 0.32 0.21 0.15
Other 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.21
Composition of the Household
Size of the Household 3.47 3.30 3.69 3.82
Married Couple 0.84 0.83 0.91 0.85
Earnings
Total Income < $30,000 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.09
$30,000  Total Income < $50,000 0.20 0.31 0.09 0.13
$50,000  Total Income < $100,000 0.45 0.37 0.51 0.45
Total Income  $100,000 0.23 0.25 0.37 0.34
Age of the Female
Under 40 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.58
Between 40 and 49 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.22
50 and Older 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.20
Age of the Male
Under 40 0.52 0.33 0.49 0.47
Between 40 and 49 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.32
50 and Older 0.23 0.30 0.13 0.21
Size of the Diapers
Size 1 0.19 0.21 0.12 0.13
Size 2 0.22 0.29 0.20 0.19
Size 3 0.31 0.25 0.40 0.35
Size 4 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.32
Chosen Brand
Pampers 0.42 0.27 0.35 0.25
Huggies 0.35 0.25 0.48 0.22
LUVS 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11
Private Label 0.17 0.36 0.13 0.41
Number of Household-Week 484 516 686 584
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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2.4.3 Identication Strategy
Discounted prices have di¤erent e¤ects on consumerspurchase behaviors. In partic-
ular, three di¤erent price e¤ects can occur simultaneously or separately. First, the
price paid by consumers has an e¤ect on the quantity they buy and on the buyers
utility. Second, when a product is on promotion, consumers may use the PP price
as a signal of quality. This will happen most often for consumers who are not fa-
miliar with the brand (Darke and Chung, 2005). Uninformed consumers facing a
product not on sale may similarly use the price paid as a signal of quality. Third,
when the price of a product is discounted, consumers can also derive extra utility
directly. It has been shown that promotions can increase consumersperceptions of
the o¤er value. This is related to the transaction utility (Thaler, 1975) and the idea
that discounts augment buyersutility beyond the economic consequences (Darke
and Chung, 2005). The usual price e¤ect is present in all situations, no matter how
informed consumers are. In this work, I focus on the signaling e¤ect of the PP price.
By denition, this e¤ect only happens when the price is on promotion. Further, it is
only present when people are uninformed about the product. By comparing a rst
purchase with subsequent purchases when the product is on promotion, I am able
to disentangle the bargaining e¤ect from the signaling e¤ect. Looking at informed
consumers facing no promotion, allows me to identify the usual price e¤ect.
Table 2.4 summarizes the di¤erent e¤ects disaggregated by consumer type and
promotion status. Price can be discounted or not, and consumers can be informed
about the brand or not. In Table 2.4, uninformed consumers could learn about
the products quality via the price paid if there is no promotion. Once a consumer
is an informed user, she no longer needs quality signals and this e¤ect disappears.
When products are on promotion, these price cuts may impact consumersutility
and behavior directly. It does not matter whether or not they are informed.
Table 2.4: Indentication Strategy
Price
Consumers With Discount No Discount
Uninformed Quality Signal1 Quality Signal2
Price E¤ect Price E¤ect
Bargain
Informed Price E¤ect Price E¤ect
Bargain
1 from the pre-promotion price, 2 from the price paid
Therefore, comparing uninformed consumers and informed consumers when there
is no discount allows me to isolate the quality signal of the price paid. Comparing
uninformed consumers and informed consumers when there is a discount allows me
to identify the quality signal of the PP price. Finally, comparing informed consumers
when there is a discount with informed consumers when there is no discount allows
me to identify the bargaining e¤ect of the discount.
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2.5 Empirics
In Section 2.3, I provided a theoretical learning model to understand the mechanisms
through which price e¤ects may operate. In this section, I present details on the
models that are estimated as well as the results. I rst look at quantity regressions
and then at a structural individual choice model.
2.5.1 Quantity Regressions
The rst equation of interest is of the form:
ln(Qijt) = 0 + 1 ln(pijt) + 2 ln(Pijt) Sijt + T3Xit + T4 Yjt + "ijt; (2.4)
where Qijt is the quantity of product j bought by household i at time t  dened as
the number of packages multiplied by the number of diapers in the package, , pijt price
per diaper of product j o¤ered to a consumer i at time t, Pijt is the pre-promotion
(PP) price per diaper of product j o¤ered to consumer i at time t, Sijt is an indicator
equal to 1 if Pijt 6= pijt (i.e., there is a discount) when household i buys product j at
time t, Xit are demographics of the household, and Yjt are product characteristics.
The product is dened as a brand-diaper sizecombination. Further, Xit contains
the size of the household, whether this is the rst purchase or the purchase frequency,
ethnicity, and income of the household. Yjt contains a brand indicator and a diaper
size indicator. I also include city, retailer, year, and month xed e¤ects. These xed
e¤ects are included because unobserved events can happen during one year, one
month or at one retailer that may have a general impact on demand. As I cannot
entirely observe them, I control for them by including xed e¤ects. At each t (week),
a consumer i can buy at most one brand-diaper sizecombination.
I start by running regressions including only the price paid. Various OLS re-
gressions are presented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.5. As expected, the price
(per unit) has a negative impact on the quantity purchased but this e¤ect is not
very strong. It is, of course, unrealistic to think that price is exogenous and the
correlation between prices and demand shocks are included in the econometric error
term. An instrument that is directly correlated with the price but not directly with
the demand is needed. Following Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001), I use the price
of the same product in all other available markets (from the total scanner panel) as
an instrument. The justication for such an instrument is that city-specic demand
shocks are independent across cities. A demand shock for a particular brand will
then not be correlated with prices of the same brand in other cities. Due to common
marginal cost shocks, prices of a brand in di¤erent cities are, however, not indepen-
dent of each other (Nevo, 2001). Columns (5) to (9) of Table 2.5 present instrumental
variable regressions. The price coe¢ cient becomes more negative, which is what was
expected.18 The rst stage F-test is large, which indicates that the instrument is not
weak.
18As the regressions presented are log-log regressions, the coe¢ cients of the price coe¢ cient can
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To proxy for inventory e¤ect, I add some dummy variables indicating the time
spent since the last purchase of a household. Four categories are included: rst
purchase (that is, there is no inter-purchase time), two weeks or less, three to four
weeks, and ve to six weeks. The omitted category is more than 6 weeks. In the
OLS regressions, the dummies are partially signicant and have the expected sign.
The longer the time since last purchase, the more the consumer buys (the coe¢ cient
is less negative). In the IV regressions however, none of the dummies is signicant.
My variable of interest is the PP price the Pijt as mentioned in equation (2.4))
and, thus, I include it in the next set of regressions. Table 2.6 presents OLS and
IV regressions with the price paid as well as the PP price as regressors. I again
instrument the price paid with the price from the other markets. The PP price
is probably endogenous as well. To instrument for it, I use characteristics of rivals
products as proposed by Berry et al. (1995). In my setting, I consider how often other
products (other disposable diapers, brands, size combinations) at the same store are
on promotion. The idea is that characteristics of a specic product will depend on
how closely substitutable this product is with the other o¤ered products. However,
characteristics of other rival products should not a¤ect consumersvaluation of a
specic product. It can be seen that the price coe¢ cient remains negative and the
values are similar to the ones in Table 2.5. The PP price appears to have a positive
e¤ect on the quantity bought. This e¤ect is stable even when I include year, retailer,
and month xed e¤ects.
Table 2.7 shows two instrument regressions for informed and less informed con-
sumers. Column (1) presents regressions for people for whom I have information
on their rst purchase. They are, therefore, relatively new to the market and less
informed than the informed consumers in column (2). These latter consumers have
been in the market longer and have better information on the products and brands
o¤ered. The mean price elasticity is lower for the less informed consumers. This
is consistent with what has been found in the literature; namely, that new parents
are less elastic because of time constraints and lack of information (Calzolari et al.,
2012). The variable of interest is the coe¢ cient on the PP price. It is signicant and
positive in both columns. These two coe¢ cients do not necessarily capture the same
thing. While the coe¢ cient in column (1) may capture the informative e¤ect of the
PP price, the coe¢ cient in column (2) may be related to the fact that people like
bargains.
I further try to disentangle the PP price e¤ect for inexperienced consumers. My
underlying assumption here is that once an individual has tried a brand, she knows its
quality and thus the signaling e¤ect should not come into play.19 Table 2.8 presents
results for individuals for whom I have information on their very rst purchase. I
add an interaction term between the (log of) unit price paid, the (log of) unit PP
be considered as mean elasticities. The values I nd are very similar to the ones found in Rickert
(2016).
19It could be that consumers need more than one purchase to totally learn the quality of a
product. If this is the case, the signaling e¤ect of the PP price found can be considered as a lower
bound of the total signaling e¤ect.
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Table 2.5: OLS and IV Regressions, Unit Price Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Unit Price Paid -0.237 -0.239 -0.247 -0.248 -3.663 -3.730 -2.431 -2.544
(0.068) (0.068) (0.055) (0.055) (0.473) (0.482) (0.271) (0.291)
Brand
Pampers 0.311 0.313 0.183 0.180 1.489 1.519 0.904 0.935
(0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.150) (0.153) (0.104) (0.111)
Huggies 0.108 0.111 -0.025 -0.025 1.091 1.129 0.605 0.644
(0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.128) (0.132) (0.092) (0.098)
LUVS 0.094 0.091 0.039 0.034 0.346 0.364 0.123 0.131
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.071) (0.074) (0.062) (0.064)
Diaper Size
Size 1-2 0.147 0.142 0.111 0.110 -1.465 -1.492 -0.940 -0.991
(0.055) (0.055) (0.046) (0.047) (0.238) (0.241) (0.141) (0.149)
Size 3 0.251 0.253 0.283 0.283 -1.123 -1.137 -0.602 -0.647
(0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.041) (0.190) (0.193) (0.117) (0.124)
Size 4 0.086 0.090 0.142 0.142 -0.736 -0.729 -0.339 -0.364
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.126) (0.127) (0.079) (0.084)
Household Demographics
Chicago 0.328 0.327 0.258 0.248 0.134 0.133
(0.031) (0.031) (0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056)
Size of the Household -0.041 -0.039 -0.016 -0.016 -0.092 -0.089 -0.063 -0.065
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018)
White 0.009 0.011 0.039 0.038 -0.101 -0.101 -0.012 -0.018
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.059) (0.060) (0.041) (0.042)
Income  30,000USD -0.458 -0.446 -0.167 -0.172 -0.617 -0.605 -0.280 -0.289
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.109) (0.110) (0.082) (0.084)
30,000  Income <49,999USD -0.209 -0.219 -0.098 -0.0987 -0.223 -0.243 -0.108 -0.107
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.075) (0.077) (0.059) (0.060)
50,000  Income <99,999USD -0.072 -0.069 -0.0027 -0.003 -0.284 -0.287 -0.148 -0.156
(0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.068) (0.0688) (0.047) (0.048)
Time Since Last Purchase
First Diaper Purchase -0.144 -0.146 -0.071 -0.074 -0.178 -0.177 -0.074 -0.074
(0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.063) (0.170) (0.172) (0.118) (0.126)
Two weeks or less -0.178 -0.171 -0.108 -0.110 -0.148 -0.135 -0.076 -0.079
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.072) (0.073) (0.049) (0.051)
Three or four weeks -0.122 -0.117 -0.023 -0.026 -0.069 -0.059 -0.002 -0.010
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.073) (0.074) (0.051) (0.052)
Five or six weeks -0.017 -0.020 0.017 0.011 -0.006 -0.004 0.021 0.006
(0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037) (0.082) (0.082) (0.055) (0.057)
Fixed E¤ects
Year no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Retailer no no yes yes no no yes yes
Month no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 3.881 3.840 3.730 3.673 -0.796 -1.034 0.841 0.558
(0.117) (0.120) (0.109) (0.133) (0.640) (0.663) (0.370) (0.418)
N 2252 2252 2252 2252 2244 2244 2244 2244
adj. R2 0.163 0.166 0.409 0.408
First Stage F-test 99.80 98.00 128.89 115.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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Table 2.6: OLS and IV Regressions, Unit Price Paid and Unit Pre Promotion Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Prices
Unit Price Paid -0.258 -0.259 -0.235 -0.236 -3.353 -3.386 -2.511 -2.619
(0.073) (0.073) (0.057) (0.057) (0.427) (0.430) (0.286) (0.306)
Unit PP Price 0.036 0.034 -0.022 -0.022 0.879 0.885 0.484 0.508
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.149) (0.149) (0.110) (0.114)
Brand
Pampers 0.334 0.335 0.171 0.168 1.752 1.770 1.113 1.152
(0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.044) (0.173) (0.173) (0.131) (0.138)
Huggies 0.132 0.133 -0.039 -0.038 1.422 1.448 0.853 0.898
(0.047) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) (0.159) (0.162) (0.124) (0.131)
LUVS 0.100 0.098 0.035 0.030 0.411 0.424 0.188 0.199
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.082) (0.084) (0.069) (0.071)
Diaper Size
Size 1-2 0.139 0.135 0.115 0.113 -1.255 -1.267 -0.919 -0.962
(0.057) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047) (0.209) (0.210) (0.146) (0.154)
Size 3 0.246 0.248 0.285 0.285 -0.914 -0.919 -0.561 -0.599
(0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.161) (0.162) (0.120) (0.126)
Size 4 0.087 0.091 0.141 0.142 -0.507 -0.500 -0.273 -0.289
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.106) (0.106) (0.083) (0.087)
Household Demographics
Chicago 0.324 0.323 0.184 0.175 0.130 0.133
(0.031) (0.031) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Size of the Household -0.040 -0.039 -0.016 -0.016 -0.082 -0.080 -0.068 -0.069
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
White 0.011 0.012 0.038 0.037 -0.042 -0.042 0.023 0.018
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.056) (0.056) (0.042) (0.044)
Income  30,000USD -0.456 -0.444 -0.168 -0.173 -0.567 -0.558 -0.268 -0.276
(0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.110) (0.110) (0.090) (0.092)
30,000  Income <49,999USD -0.213 -0.222 -0.097 -0.098 -0.291 -0.305 -0.121 -0.121
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.074) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064)
50,000  Income <99,999USD -0.069 -0.066 -0.005 -0.006 -0.154 -0.153 -0.078 -0.081
(0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.060) (0.060) (0.049) (0.051)
Time Since Last Purchase
First Diaper Purchase -0.139 -0.141 -0.074 -0.076 -0.074 -0.073 -0.039 -0.050
(0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.063) (0.160) (0.161) (0.123) (0.132)
Two weeks or less -0.175 -0.168 -0.110 -0.112 -0.057 -0.046 -0.024 -0.030
(0.039) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.074) (0.054) (0.055)
Three or four weeks -0.121 -0.116 -0.024 -0.026 -0.060 -0.053 0.012 0.004
(0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.070) (0.070) (0.054) (0.055)
Five or six weeks -0.019 -0.022 0.018 0.012 -0.056 -0.055 0.017 0.001
(0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.037) (0.076) (0.077) (0.057) (0.058)
Fixed E¤ects
Year no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Retailer no no yes yes no no yes yes
Month no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 3.853 3.814 3.749 3.691 -0.305 -0.448 0.689 0.469
(0.123) (0.126) (0.112) (0.135) (0.575) (0.587) (0.398) (0.439)
N 2252 2252 2252 2252 2110 2110 2110 2110
adj. R2 0.164 0.166 0.409 0.408
First Stage F-test
Unit Price 79.17 78.51 66.72 60.89
Unit PP Price 165.84 166.44 80.12 78.69
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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Table 2.7: IV Regressions, Informed and Less Informed Consumers
(1) (2)
Uninformed Consumers Informed Consumer
Prices
Unit Price Paid -1.845 -4.903
(0.278) (1.047)
Unit PP Price 0.711 0.886
(0.156) (0.408)
Brand
Pampers 0.949 2.113
(0.140) (0.488)
Huggies 0.745 1.887
(0.138) (0.507)
LUVS 0.195 0.467
(0.114) (0.192)
Diaper Size
Size 1-2 -0.707 -1.840
(0.172) (0.464)
Size 3 -0.441 -1.192
(0.157) (0.348)
Size 4 -0.063 -0.723
(0.109) (0.215)
Household Demographics
Chicago 0.252 -0.088
(0.0870) (0.121)
Size of the Household -0.094 -0.046
(0.031) (0.034)
White 0.007 0.026
(0.065) (0.104)
Income  30,000USD -0.269 -0.258
(0.140) (0.145)
30,000  Income <49,999USD -0.035 -0.225
(0.0935) (0.116)
50,000  Income <99,999USD 0.086 -0.322
(0.0873) (0.118)
Time Since Last Purchase
First Diaper Purchase -0.124
(0.127)
Two weeks or less -0.081 -0.074
(0.074) (0.105)
Three or four weeks 0.009 -0.107
(0.072) (0.117)
Five or six weeks 0.046 -0.094
(0.084) (0.114)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes
Month yes yes
Retailer yes yes
Constant 1.702 -2.647
(0.433) (1.446)
N 924 1186
First Stage F-test
Unit Price 50.22 15.09
Unit PP Price 31.23 26.73
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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price (if on promotion) and whether a consumer is making her rst brand purchase.
The price paid has the expected negative sign in general. Once interacted with the
rst purchase indicator, the unit paid price has no signicant e¤ect on the quan-
tity purchased.20 Therefore, the price paid appears not to have any di¤erent e¤ect
depending on whether consumers are making their rst or subsequent purchases.
People uninformed about the product may use the price paid as a signal of quality,
but this e¤ect cannot be clearly identied apart from the allocative price e¤ect. For
its part, the PP price has an overall positive e¤ect. This is compatible with the idea
that people like bargains and that it entices them to buy more. However, when it
is interacted with the rst brand purchase, this e¤ect is negative. This nding is
consistent with the idea that when people are uninformed they rst try the product
in a limited quantity. All regressions include dummies accounting for inter-purchase
time to proxy for inventory e¤ects. These variables are not signicant except for the
rst purchase indicator, which is negatively related to the quantity bought.
These presented results shed some light on how quantity decisions are made.
The PP price has a positive impact on quantity bought when people are informed
about the products quality but a negative impact when they are making their rst
purchase. In the next subsection, I look at whether consumers decide to buy at all.
2.5.2 Individual Choice Model
Once an individual is in the store, she decides to buy one of the four leading brands
available, to buy another brand, or not to buy diapers at all. The decision is inu-
enced by brand attributes as well as individual characteristics. Each time a household
goes to a store, it faces ve options: buying Pampers, buying Huggies, buying LUVS,
buying the private label brand, or not buying/buying from another brand.21
In particular, the individual chooses the brand (conditional on the diaper size)
that maximizes her utility. Dene the utility of a household i buying brand j at time
t as
Uijt = Vijt + eijt
= xijt + witj + eijt;
where xijt are attributes of a particular choice, wit are characteristics of the household
and eijt are the random components. The xijt thus vary across the choices  and
possibly across individuals while the wit are xed over choices in t. In my setting
I have:
xijt: price paid, PP price and interactions with the rst purchase,
20As the rst purchase is the result of an exogenous event, I can use the product of the rst
purchase and the instrument for the price (or PP price) as an instrument for the interaction term
(Balli and Sørensen, 2013).
21The decisions of not buying at all and buying from another diaper brand are combined into
one decision option and labelled as the outside option.
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Table 2.8: IV Regressions, Less Informed Consumers
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Prices
Unit Price Paid -1.843 -1.818 -1.816
(0.280) (0.276) (0.274)
Unit PP Price 0.726 0.800 0.801
(0.159) (0.179) (0.178)
Unit Price  First Brand Purchase -0.105 0.074
(0.061) (0.072)
Original Price  First Brand Purchase -0.445 -0.501
(0.149) (0.180)
Brand
Pampers 0.961 0.952 0.944
(0.141) (0.139) (0.137)
Huggies 0.756 0.743 0.736
(0.140) (0.137) (0.135)
LUVS 0.169 0.172 0.187
(0.113) (0.105) (0.106)
Diaper Size
Size 1-2 -0.729 -0.703 -0.687
(0.173) (0.171) (0.171)
Size 3 -0.448 -0.446 -0.442
(0.158) (0.156) (0.155)
Size 4 -0.065 -0.055 -0.053
Household Characteristics
Chicago 0.254 0.253 0.252
(0.088) (0.087) (0.087)
Size of the Household -0.094 -0.101 -0.102
(0.031) (0.030) (0.0303)
White 0.010 -0.0137 -0.0182
(0.0658) (0.064) (0.064)
Income  30,000USD -0.277 -0.268 -0.261
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
30,000  Income <49,999USD -0.033 -0.034 -0.035
(0.095) (0.093) (0.092)
50,000  Income <99,999USD 0.086 0.096 0.098
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Time Since Last Purchase
First Diaper Purchase -0.256 -0.349 -0.284
(0.145) (0.129) (0.133)
Two weeks or less -0.071 -0.067 -0.072
(0.0751) (0.0752) (0.0751)
Three or four weeks 0.024 0.021 0.013
(0.074) (0.072) (0.073)
Five or six weeks 0.059 0.061 0.054
(0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
Fixed E¤ect
Year yes yes yes
Month yes yes yes
Retailer yes yes yes
Constant 1.667 1.767 1.799
(0.437) (0.430) (0.426)
N 924 924 924
First Stage F-test
Unit Price 34.02 35.93 27.02
Unit PP Price 23.40 162.24 159.18
Unit Price  First Purchase 1126.74 812.30
Unit PP Price  First Purchase 609.66 500.75
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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wit: household characteristics.
A household i chooses brand j if this gives it the highest utility. The utility from
the outside good (not buying one of the four leading brands) is normalized to
Ui0t = wit0 + ei0t:
This means that the individual characteristics enter the utility but the brand char-
acteristics are normalized to zero.
Assuming that the random terms eijt are iid type I extreme value distributed,
the probability that household i chooses brand j in period t is:
PRijt =
exp(Vijt)
JP
k=0
exp(Vikt)
;
where J is the total number of brands o¤ered and j = 0 corresponds to the outside
good.
In order to investigate the price e¤ect of the rst purchase, I include an interaction
between the price paid, the PP price, and whether it is a rst brand purchase. Table
2.9 displays the results of the alternative specic coe¢ cients for di¤erent specica-
tions. Table 2.10 reports the individual characteristics for each brand for specication
(5) in Table 2.9. The complete tables with individual characteristics for each brand
and each specication can be found in Appendix 2.6.
Table 2.9: Alternative Specic Conditional Logit of Purchase Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Brand Choice
Unit Price Paid -5.402 -5.426 -5.730 -4.686 -4.557
(0.669) (0.671) (0.673) (0.667) (0.669)
Unit PP Price -0.111 1.130 -0.138 -0.353
(0.254) (0.273) (0.256) (0.281)
Unit PP Price and First Purchase -4.061 1.173+
(0.466) (0.627)
Unit Price Paid and First Purchase -5.949 -6.558
(0.390) (0.520)
N 27190 27190 27190 27190 27190
Log-Likelihood -3560.083 -3515.518 -3559.987 -3412.016 -3410.277
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
All specications include individual characteristics as well as a constant, all interacted with each brand.
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
As expected, the price paid has a negative e¤ect on the probability of buying a
particular brand. The price paid at a rst purchase has a similarly signicant negative
impact on the probability of buying a certain brand. Uninformed consumers may
use the price paid as a signal of quality when there is no promotion. However, it is
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Table 2.10: Individual Characteristics for Column (5) of Table 2.9
Pampers Huggies LUVS Private Label
Female under 30 1.186 1.142 0.394 1.250
(0.246) (0.294) (0.613) (0.279)
Female 30-44 0.374 0.522 0.453 1.010
(0.147) (0.158) (0.313) (0.183)
Highest Ed: High School -0.638 0.727 -0.398 0.763
(0.195) (0.220) (0.559) (0.230)
Highest Ed: College -0.193 -0.050 0.499 -0.234
(0.157) (0.182) (0.513) (0.224)
Black 0.225 0.531 1.309 0.117
(0.234) (0.245) (1.093) (0.280)
White 0.019 -0.064 1.976+ 0.173
(0.175) (0.223) (0.219) (0.214)
Married 0.318+ -0.121 0.447 0.293
(0.188) (0.202) (0.201) (0.206)
Chicago 0.117 -0.001 -1.001 0.869
(0.133) (0.139) (0.274) (0.175)
Income 30,000-49,999 0.979 -0.174 -0.249 -0.112
(0.350) (0.284) (0.477) (0.257)
Income 50,000-99,000 1.021 0.089 -0.513 -0.317
(0.339) (0.272) (0.454) (0.252)
Income 100,000 and over 0.283 0.730 -2.361 -0.624
(0.361) (0.294) (0.754) (0.294)
Size of the Household 0.020 0.014 0.430 -0.009
(0.057) (0.053) (0.117) (0.060)
Constant -2.125 -1.907 -5.416 -3.137
(0.484) (0.465) (1.298) (0.503)
Standard errors in parentheses,+ p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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di¢ cult to distinguish this e¤ect from the usual negative price e¤ect. In general, the
PP price when the brand is on promotion does not have a clear impact. Focusing
on column (5), which is the most complete specication, it can be seen that the PP
e¤ect is not signicant. However, when it is interacted with the rst purchase, it has a
positive impact on the choice decision. This is in line with the idea that individuals
who are uninformed about a brand use the price they see as a signal of quality.
Table 2.10 displays the results on the individual characteristics. The lowest level of
educational achievement increases the probability of buying the generic brand. On
the other hand, having a very high income decreases the probability of choosing the
private label and LUVS.
This subsection shows that the PP price can trigger peoples decisions to buy
when they are uninformed. While in general, the PP price does not have a signicant
e¤ect on the probability of purchase, it does have a positive e¤ect when people are
uninformed.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I aim to o¤er insights about how people react to discounted prices. In
particular, I investigate the e¤ects of the pre-promotion (PP) price when a product
is discounted.
I start by presenting a theoretical learning model that provides an understanding
of the mechanisms that may take place. My focus is on experience goods whose
characteristics such as quality are di¢ cult to know in advance, but can be de-
termined upon consumption (Nelson, 1970). When a product is on sale, people
uninformed about its quality may use the PP price as a quality signal. Once people
have used the product and they know its quality, the PP price no longer provides
information on quality. However, the fact that a price is discounted may directly im-
pact consumerspurchases and utilities. For example, a high PP price can increase
an individuals utility because it increases consumersperceptions of savings (Grewal
and Compeau, 2007).
For my empirical analysis, I use panel data from the Nielsen Company on con-
sumer purchases. I consider the disposable diaper category and investigate brand
choices. I look at how a PP price impacts the quantity people buy, along with how
it impacts their purchase decisions to buy at all. Because of the panel structure of
my data, I am able to follow the same consumers over time. I can observe their rst
purchase as uninformed consumers as well as their subsequent purchases. This
allows me to distinguish between the signaling e¤ect that the PP price may have and
the direct e¤ect that a good deal may have on a consumers utility.
My ndings are consistent with the idea that the PP price is taken into account
by people who are uninformed about a brand. This non-discounted price convinces
consumers to buy a product even if they are not fully informed about it. However, it
does not increase the quantity of the product that they buy. When an individual does
not know the quality of a product, she will rst try it in a limited quantity. These
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results may be of interest for marketers who want to enter a new market or attract a
new group of consumers. While an uninformed consumer will react positively to the
PP price of a product on promotion, she will not increase her purchase quantity. In
this sense, it may not be optimal to make such a product available in a large quantity
for this type of consumer.
Further research is needed to investigate these mechanisms with other products.
Diapers are a useful category because uniformed consumers are easily observable.
However, it would be interesting to investigate a totally new product through a
similar research method. In my empirical ndings, once a consumer has tried the
product, she knows the quality and I assume that the quality signal does not come
into play. It could be, however, that a consumer needs more than one trial to perfectly
know the products quality. If this is the case, my ndings on the signaling e¤ect of
the PP price can be considered as a lower bound of the total signaling e¤ect.
Despite its limitations, this work provides interesting insights about how and
why people react to discounted prices. The literature on discount pricing itself has
received little economic analysis (Armstrong and Chen, 2013) and this work makes
a contribution to the eld.
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Appendix
Details of the Learning Model
In Section 2.3, the general features of a learning model are presented. More details
are discussed in this section.
Consumer i does her shopping in period t and faces products j = 1; :::; J . The
price paid is denoted pijt. The discount (if any) is denoted by dit and the price without
discount the pre-promotion (PP) price is denoted by Pijt. Thus Pijt = pijt   dijt.
If there is no discount, the price paid is equal to the PP price. The PP price
serves as a signal for consumers22 and they use it when making inferences about
product quality.23 The good considered is an experience good and is assumed to be
nondurable enough that it is consumed before the next purchase (as in Ackerberg,
2003). In a given period, consumers observe prices of all the products available as
well as their discounts and decide to purchase one of the products or the outside
alternative.
Following Erdem et al. (2008), I assume the following form for the utility function:
Uijt = ipijt + iQ
E
ijt + iri
 
QEijt
2
+ iDijt + eijt;
where pijt is the price paid by the consumer for this product, QEijt is the experience
quality(Erdem et al., 2008) or experience utility(Ackerberg, 2003), ri represents
the consumers risk aversion towards variations in quality, Dijt is the deviation from
the reference price (details below) and eijt is a taste shock known to the consumer
but not to the econometrician.
Experience quality, QEijt is the measure of the utility that consumer i derives from
product characteristics that are not directly observable to her and are not known
before the purchase. The QEijt might, for example, how long it takes to experience
the rst leak in the diaper. Once the good is purchased and used, QEijt is revealed.
The simplest case is a one-period learning process where QEijt is constant for all future
periods. In that case, after one purchase, the consumer knows the experience utility
22This is unlike Erdem et al., 2008 who assume that the price signal always comes from the price
paid.
23When a product is presented at 50USD instead of 100USD, I assume that people use 100USD
to infer quality rather than 50USD.
37
CHAPTER 2. APPENDIX 38
for all future t. The general way of writing the learning process is:
QEijt = Qj + ijt where ijt  N(0; 2). (2.5)
Qj is the true quality of the product, but consumers do not experience it directly as
the users experience is context dependent (Erdem et al., 2008). The ijt correspond
to the experience variability and are not distinguishable from the mean. When
2 = 0, corresponds to the one period learning, where Q
E
jt = Qj.
Before any experience in the market, at t = 0, individuals have some priors
about the mean prices and the mean experience quality level of products. Consumers
perceive that the true quality of product j is distributed normally with mean Qj0
and variance 2j0:
Qj  N(Qj0; 2j0):
The use experience gives households signals about the products quality (Erdem and
Keane, 1996). Let QSijt  E(QjjSit) be the households perceived quality for product
conditional on information (i.e., signals) at time t (the information set Sit), Nij (t) is
the total number of use experience signals household i has received up to t and bijt
equals 1 if product j is bought in time t. The updated perceived quality can then
be written as (Erdem and Keane, 1996):
QSijt =
2j0
Nij(t)2j0
t 1s=1Q
E
ijsbijs;
and the perceived variance is
2ijt =
1
(1=2j0) +Nij(t)(1=
2
)
(see DeGroot, 1970).
In addition, people may use the PP price as a signal of quality. It is assumed
that the PP prices observed by the consumers, Pijt, follow the process
Pijt = Pj + !ijt; !ijt  N(0; 2!); (2.6)
where Pj is the mean PP price. Deviations around the mean Pj exist because some
consumers may not see the PP price posted during a promotion, or there may be
some variations in where and when the PP price is posted. Consumers believe that
this mean price is related to the product quality as follows (Erdem et al., 2008):
Pj = 0 + 1Qj + j; (2.7)
where Qj is the products true quality as presented above. The j account for the
fact that a certain product may deviate from the typical price/quality relationship,
and have a price that is too high or too low. Consumers perceive that the j are
distributed according to j  N(0; 2).
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Consumers use the observed Pijt to learn about Pj. Thus, combining (2.6) and
(2.7) gives
Pijt = 0 + 1Qj + j + !ijt,
where 0, 1 and 
2
! would have to be estimated
24 Note that while the price observed
by the consumer Pijt is indexed by i (various consumers see di¤erent prices), the true
quality Qj is product specic.
The prior for the mean price can be written as25
Pj  N(0 + 1Qj0; 212j0 + 2) for j = 1; :::; J .
The consumers prior is that the true mean price has a variance equal to 21
2
j0 + 
2
.
Thus, a product can have an above average price because it is of high quality 21
2
j0
 or because it is priced too high given its quality 2 (Erdem et al. 2008).
The PP price also gives some signals of quality to the consumer and, therefore, the
perceived quality, including the price signal, are updated. As before, the households
perceived quality isQSijt  E(QjjSit). I further let P Sijt  E(PjjSit) be the households
perceived PP price for product j conditional on information (i.e., signals) at time t
(the information set Sit). At t = 0, these areQSij0 = Qij0 = Qj0 and P
S
ij0 = 0+1Qj0.
As mentioned, Nij (t) is the the total number of use experience signals household i
received up to t. Mij(t) is dened as the total number of PP price signals household i
received up to t. These two numbers must not be the same. People do not necessarily
get experience quality signals every period as they only get a signal if they buy and
use the product. However, people are assumed to face price signals every time they
buy one product of the considered category. If person i buys product g 6= j (from
the same category), she is assumed to get a price signal from product g and from
product j as well.
Both signals use experience and PP price impact the consumers perceived
quality. The whole process can be written (Ackerberg, 2003; DeGroot, 1970) as a
24Both 0 and a value of j cannot be estimated for each brand. Thus, the j are assumed to be
mean zero across brands,
PJ 1
j=1 j = J (Erdem et al., 2008).
25
E(Pj) = E(0 + 1Qj + j)
= E(0) + 1E(Qj) + E(j)
= 0 + 1Qj0
V ar(Pj) = E((Pj)
2
)  (E(Pj))2
= E
 
(0 + 1Qj + j)
2
  E  0 + 1Qj + j2
= 21
2
j0 + 
2

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combination of initial priors at t = 0:
Qj
Pj

 N

Qj0
0 + 1Qj0

;

2j0 1
2
j0
1
2
j0 
2
1
2
j0

;
learning process: 
QEijt
Pijt

 N

Qj
Pj

;

2 0
0 2!

;
and consumers updated beliefs about the product j after a history of observed PP
prices and use experiences: 
Qj
Pj

 N (sit;it) ;
where
sit =

QSijt
PSijt

=
 "
2j0 1
2
j0
1
2
j0 
2
1
2
j0 + 
2

# 1
+

Nij (t) 0
0 Mij(t)
 "
2 0
0 2!
# 1! 1
0BB@
"
2j0 1
2
j0
1
2
j0 
2
1
2
j0 + 
2

# 1 
Qj0
0 + 1Qj0

+

Nij (t) 0
0 Mij(t)
 "
2 0
0 2!
# 1  1
Nij(t)
PNij(t)
k=1
QEijk
1
Mij(t)
PMij(t)
=1 Pijt
1CCA
and
it =
 
2j0 1
2
j0
1
2
j0 
2
1
2
j0 + 
2

 1
+

Nij (t) 0
0 Mij(t)
 
2 0
0 2!
 1! 1
The discount is assumed to enter the utility function directly via iDijt. In
particular,
iDijt = 1Iijt(RPijt   pijt) + 2(1  Iijt)(pijt  RPijt): (2.8)
RPijt corresponds to the reference price of person i in time t for product j, Iijt =
1 if RPijt>pijt
0 if RPijt<pijt
is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is incurring a
gain or a loss compared to her reference price. This allows me to incorporate loss
aversion as well as bargain loving. The coe¢ cients are allowed to di¤er as losses may
hurt more than gains (if people are more loss averse than bargain loving) or inversely
(Armstrong and Chen, 2013). Thus Dijt =

(RPijt pijt) if RPijt>pijt
(pijt RPijt) if RPijt<pijt . Dijt can be equal
to the current discount (dijt) if the reference price is the past price, but they may
di¤er. Consumers may develop an anchor (or not) and use it to compare with the
presented price. The reference price impacts the way consumers perceive products
and may impact their choices. More details on how I dene the reference price are
provided below in the reference price subsection.
The expected utility of household i from using product j in time t can be written
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as:
E[UijtjSit] = ipijt + iE

QEijtjSit

+ iriE
h 
QEijt
2 jSiti+ iDijt + eijt;
where Sit refers to the information set of a household that contains all signals con-
sumer i has received until t. I assume that the signals are unbiased and thus
E

QEijtjSit

= E [QjjSit] = QSijt. Writing QEjt = QSijt + (Qj   QSijt) + ijt results
in:
E[UijtjSit] = ipijt+iQSijt+iri
 
QSijt
2
+iriE
h 
Qj  QSijt
2 jSiti+iDijt+iri2+eijt:
With this formulation, it can be seen that there are two sources of expected variability
of consumers experienced quality: First, the experienced variability 2 ; and second,
the variability of the experienced quality around the true quality
h 
Qj  QSijt
2 jSiti
(Erdem et al., 2008). The no purchase option is dened as
E[Ui0tjSit] =  + ei0t
Both the PP price and usage give information to the consumer on true brand quality
Qj. However, while buying and using the product gives direct information on Qj,
the PP price only provides indirect information through the consumers prior beliefs
that PP price and quality are correlated. The more direct information the consumer
acquires via using the product, the less she needs indirect information through the
PP price. Therefore, all else equal, the more usage experience an individual has,
the less information will come from the PP price signal and the less it will impact
her expected utility function. In a one-usage learning model (where true quality is
learned after one use only), the PP price will have no impact on a consumer after
she has bought the product once (Ackerberg, 2003).
Reference Price
People may develop an anchor (consciously or not) and compare it to the presented
price. The reference price (RP) impacts the way consumers perceive products and
may impact their choices. There are several ways the RP actually enters the utility
function. As stated in the literature review, there are predominantly two types of RP:
the internal reference price (IRP) and the external reference price (ERP) (Mayhew
and Winer, 1992). What is not entirely clear form the literature is whether people
have one RP for each product/brand or a general one for the category. Reference
price impacts can also be considered as an approximation for inventory. For example,
people will buy only if the price is lower than their RP and, in that case, they may buy
more than usual (to form a stockpile). In my model, I allow for di¤erent specications
of the RP.
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External Reference Price: Pre-Promotion Price
An external reference price refers to an external stimulus perceived by an individual
that may impact her product choice. In my setting, it represents the PP price that
is displayed along with the price paid. As stated above, the PP price is also the
price consumers use to make inferences about some quality of the product about
which they are unsure. Thus, in this specication, the PP price has a double role
when people are still learning about the quality of the product. Once its quality is
known, only the role as RP is present. I take inspiration from the way Ackerberg
(2003) models the prestige or image impact of advertising. In particular, uninformed
people learn something about the products quality by observing the PP price. But,
at the same time, people have a perceived PP price measure for each product which
is denoted P Sijt (the element that is updated in the learning process above). As in
Ackerberg (2003), once people know about the products quality, only this direct
e¤ect remains while the signaling e¤ect vanishes. Thus, in this case, equation (2.8)
can be written as follows:
iDijt = 1Iijt(P
S
ijt   pijt) + 2(1  Iijt)(pijt   P Sijt). (2.9)
As noted above, people update their perceived PP price for a particular brand every
time they purchase a product in this category. This is also in line with the price
consideration model of Ching et al. (2009).
It is possible that the price paid is always the PP price; that is, there is no
discount at all and P Sijt = pijt. In these cases, there is only the usual price e¤ect
and this channel shuts down automatically. By construction, consumers will mostly
experience a gain in this denition of RP. Indeed, the PP price is by denition equal
to or higher than the price paid except if a manufacturer suddenly raises its prices.
Internal Reference Price: Price Paid
There are some papers (for example, Erdem et al., 2010) claiming that frequent dis-
counts may lower consumersRP. The underlying idea is that people use the price
paid as an RP rather than the PP price and, therefore, discounts reduce their
reference point. For this specication, I take inspiration from Mayhew and Winer
(1992) and use the previous price of the considered product in the same store (pt 1)
as a proxy for the consumers IRP. As noted by Erdem et al. (2010), [u]pdating
reference prices only when households make purchases would underestimate the ref-
erence price; thus, again, I allow people to update their RP for a particular product
j even if they do not buy this very product. Contrary to the RP from the rst spec-
ication, here I am interested in the price paid in the last period (or the price that
would have been paid in the last period). Equation (2.8) becomes
iDijt = 1Iijt(p
C
ijt 1   pijt) + 2(1  Iijt)(pijt   pCijt 1), (2.10)
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where pCijt 1 is the previous actual price of product j during the last period the
consumer considered the category.26 If a product was on sale during the last period
and is not on sale this period, consumers may get less utility and I expect 2 to be
negative. Here again, if the price of a product does not change, then pijt = pCijt and
this e¤ect disappears.
I do not follow the same concept as Erdem et al. (2008) who state that people
use the price paid also to infer quality. Instead, I maintain my idea that consumers
use the PP price to infer quality (Monroe and Chapman,1987).
Conditional Logit Complete Tables
Table 2.11: Alternative Specic Conditional Logit for Purchase Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
choice choice choice choice choice
Brand Choice
Unit Price Paid -5.402 -5.426 -5.730 -4.686 -4.557
(0.669) (0.671) (0.673) (0.667) (0.669)
Unit PP Price -0.111 1.130 -0.138 -0.353
(0.254) (0.273) (0.256) (0.281)
Unit PP Price and First Purchase -4.061 1.173+
(0.466) (0.627)
Unit Price Paid and First Purchase -5.949 -6.558
(0.390) (0.520)
N 27190 27190 27190 27190 27190
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
All specications include individual characteristics as well as a constant, all interacted with each brand.
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
26It is indexed by t   1, but the price considered may come from t   1, t   2, ... depending on
the last time consumer bought this product.
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Table 2.12: Individual Characteristics for Pampers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female under 30 1.181 1.182 1.175 1.187 1.186
(0.242) (0.242) (0.243) (0.246) (0.246)
Female 30-44 0.063 0.064 0.176 0.376 0.374
(0.140) (0.140) (0.142) (0.147) (0.147)
Highest Ed: High School -0.759 -0.758 -0.704 -0.638 -0.638
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.195) (0.195)
Highest Ed: College 0.000 0.001 -0.077 -0.194 -0.193
(0.152) (0.152) (0.154) (0.157) (0.157)
Black -0.008 -0.007 0.082 0.229 0.225
(0.220) (0.220) (0.224) (0.234) (0.234)
White -0.199 -0.196 -0.118 0.0213 0.0186
(0.163) (0.163) (0.166) (0.175) (0.175)
Married 0.297 0.297 0.316+ 0.321+ 0.318+
(0.185) (0.185) (0.186) (0.188) (0.188)
Chicago 0.193 0.194 0.151 0.115 0.117
(0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.133) (0.133)
Income 30,000-49,999 1.078 1.077 1.061 0.982 0.979
(0.343) (0.343) (0.345) (0.350) (0.350)
Income 50,000-99,000 1.370 1.371 1.246 1.020 1.021
(0.334) (0.334) (0.336) (0.339) (0.339)
Income 100,000 and over 0.429 0.430 0.398 0.287 0.283
(0.357) (0.356) (0.358) (0.361) (0.361)
Size of the Household 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.020 0.020
(0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0540) (0.0568) (0.0568)
Constant -2.301 -2.288 -2.247 -2.120 -2.125
(0.475) (0.476) (0.478) (0.484) (0.484)
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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Table 2.13: Individual Characteristics for Huggies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female under 30 1.024 1.029 1.041 1.138 1.142
(0.278) (0.278) (0.282) (0.294) (0.294)
Female 30-44 0.550 0.551 0.542 0.522 0.522
(0.152) (0.152) (0.153) (0.158) (0.158)
Highest Ed: High School 0.478 0.481 0.538 0.725 0.727
(0.209) (0.210) (0.212) (0.220) (0.220)
Highest Ed: College -0.0474 -0.0464 -0.0599 -0.0497 -0.0503
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.182) (0.182)
Black 0.795 0.797 0.730 0.536 0.531
(0.242) (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) (0.245)
White -0.058 -0.057 -0.03 -0.059 -0.064
(0.214) (0.214) (0.216) (0.219) (0.219)
Married -0.017 -0.015 -0.045 -0.115 -0.121
(0.189) (0.189) (0.192) (0.201) (0.201)
Chicago -0.204 -0.204 -0.127 -0.000 -0.001
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139)
Income 30,000-49,999 -0.208 -0.207 -0.187 -0.174 -0.174
(0.271) (0.271) (0.275) (0.284) (0.284)
Income 50,000-99,000 0.004 0.005 0.030 0.087 0.089
(0.260) (0.261) (0.264) (0.272) (0.272)
Income 100,000 and over 0.523+ 0.522+ 0.592 0.730 0.730
(0.283) (0.283) (0.286) (0.294) (0.294)
Size of the Household 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.013 0.014
(0.0540) (0.0541) (0.0535) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Constant -1.956 -1.942 -1.928 -1.903 -1.907
(0.454) (0.455) (0.456) (0.465) (0.465)
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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Table 2.14: Individual Characteristics for LUVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female under 30 -0.202 -0.200 -0.064 0.384 0.394
(0.606) (0.606) (0.602) (0.611) (0.613)
Female 30-44 0.286 0.287 0.319 0.449 0.453
(0.306) (0.306) (0.307) (0.313) (0.313)
Highest Ed: High School -0.435 -0.434 -0.423 -0.395 -0.398
(0.548) (0.548) (0.550) (0.559) (0.559)
Highest Ed: College 0.537 0.536 0.536 0.503 0.499
(0.506) (0.506) (0.506) (0.513) (0.513)
Black 1.493 1.493 1.469 1.317 1.309
(1.081) (1.081) (1.083) (1.093) (1.093)
White 2.202 2.204 2.184 1.988+ 1.976+
(1.028) (1.028) (1.028) (1.031) (1.031)
Married 0.542 0.543 0.545 0.454 0.447
(0.426) (0.426) (0.426) (0.426) (0.426)
Chicago -1.073 -1.072 -1.045 -1.001 -1.006
(0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.274) (0.274)
Income 30,000-49,999 -0.631 -0.631 -0.539 -0.256 -0.249
(0.467) (0.467) (0.467) (0.476) (0.477)
Income 50,000-99,000 -0.939 -0.938 -0.811+ -0.511 -0.513
(0.430) (0.430) (0.432) (0.453) (0.454)
Income 100,000 and over -3.115 -3.116 -2.968 -2.381 -2.361
(0.739) (0.739) (0.740) (0.753) (0.754)
Size of the Household 0.532 0.532 0.513 0.433 0.430
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Constant -6.131 -6.123 -6.038 -5.447 -5.416
(1.259) (1.259) (1.265) (1.296) (1.298)
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.
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Table 2.15: Individual Characteristics for Private Label
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female under 30 1.276 1.280 1.269 1.254 1.250
(0.276) (0.276) (0.277) (0.279) (0.279)
Female 30-44 0.948 0.948 0.973 1.012 1.010
(0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.183) (0.183)
Highest Ed: High School 0.994 0.996 0.922 0.764 0.763
(0.234) (0.234) (0.233) (0.230) (0.230)
Highest Ed: College -0.118 -0.117 -0.148 -0.231 -0.234
(0.227) (0.227) (0.226) (0.224) (0.224)
Black 0.191 0.193 0.166 0.122 0.117
(0.283) (0.283) (0.282) (0.280) (0.280)
White 0.307 0.306 0.260 0.174 0.173
(0.218) (0.218) (0.217) (0.214) (0.214)
Married 0.440 0.441 0.405 0.297 0.293
(0.206) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.206)
Chicago 0.830 0.833 0.857 0.875 0.869
(0.168) (0.168) (0.170) (0.175) (0.175)
Income 30,000-49,999 -0.222 -0.219 -0.149 -0.101 -0.112
(0.254) (0.254) (0.255) (0.257) (0.257)
Income 50,000-99,000 -0.455+ -0.451+ -0.382 -0.308 -0.317
(0.253) (0.253) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252)
Income 100,000 and over -0.559+ -0.557+ -0.562 -0.618 -0.624
(0.289) (0.289) (0.287) (0.282) (0.282)
Size of the Household -0.034 -0.033 -0.019 -0.007 -0.009
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Constant -3.655 -3.651 -3.544 -3.156 -3.137
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.504) (0.503)
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Calculations based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases.

Chapter 3
Risky Lifestyle Behaviors and
Breast Cancer Diagnosis
joint project with Michelle Sovinsky 1 and Steven Stern 2
3.1 Introduction
The National Cancer Institute spent more than $550 million in 2013 to investigate
the causes of breast cancer (NCI Annual Factbook).3 According to the Surveillance
Epidemiology and End Results Program, almost 13% of US women will develop
breast cancer at some point during their life.4 Furthermore, the incidence of breast
cancer is rising worldwide, and its impact is high in terms of mortality, costs of
treatment, and emotional impact on the individual and family (Parkin et al., 2005).5
There are many avenues of research that require funding regarding the breast cancer,
including treatment and research into the biological causes.
Perhaps surprisingly, a large proportion of the donations for breast cancer research
are spent on public education (43%).6 An important question concerns therefore
whether and how women react to information. However, little research has been
undertaken to precisely examine how women react to information about the state of
their health. Learning more about the trade-o¤s a woman makes between unhealthy
(but enjoyable) habits and increasing her life expectancy is the focus of this paper.
1University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany and Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London, EC1V 3PZ, UK
2Stony Brook University, 11794-4384 New York, United States
3http://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/budget/fact-book/data/research-funding
4http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/breast.html
5For the United States, Campbell and Ramsey (2009) report an estimate of lifetime per-patient
cost of breast cancer going from $20,000 to $100,000. Similarly, Mariotto et al. (2011) report that
annual costs of care for breast cancer for women younger than 65 is $27,693 in the initial phase of
care and $94,284 during the last year of life.
6http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-komen-research-
idUSTRE8171KW20120208
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The medical literature reports that several lifestyle habits are associated with
breast cancer risk including weight gain, fat intake, and level of physical activity
(Demark-Wahnefried et al., 2000; McTiernan et al., 2003; Holmes, 2004; Bellizzi et
al., 2005). Weight gain and being overweight are commonly recognized risk factors
for breast cancer, with overweight women most commonly observed to be at increased
risk of post-menopausal breast cancer and at reduced risk of pre-menopausal breast
cancer (Morimoto et al., 2002; Feigelson et al., 2006; Eliassen et al., 2006). Sedentary
lifestyle is also a risk factor (Blanchard et al., 2004). Other risk factors include
those that are only weakly associated with breast cancer and those that have been
inconsistently associated with the disease in epidemiologic studies (Hamajima et
al., 2002; Bellizzi et al., 2005). These include alcohol consumption (Singletary and
Gapstur, 2001; Hamajima et al., 2002; Aronson, 2003; Coups and Ostro¤, 2005;
Terry et al., 2006) and cigarette smoking (Demark-Wahnefried et al., 2000; Pinto et
al., 2002; Hewitt et al., 2003; Blanchard et al., 2004).
Using rich data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on breast cancer
diagnosis and lifestyle choices, we estimate how being diagnosed inuences smoking,
drinking, and exercising habits for more than 9,000 women over the period 1999 to
2011. We nd that women who are recently diagnosed with breast cancer decrease
the amount of cigarettes they smoke, but they do not change their drinking habits.
In addition, women who are diagnosed with breast cancer exercise less, which is
perhaps not surprising given that women often undergo treatment after a breast
cancer diagnosis that can weaken them and make it more di¢ cult to engage in extra
physical activity. Our results suggest that women react to information about their
health; particularly those who have been newly diagnosed.
Several studies exist on the role of health behaviors of cancer survivors (in addi-
tion to those cited above, see Bellizi et al. (2005) and the references therein). Each
of these studies su¤ers from at least one of the following: it does not use a nationally
representative sample or does not address selection bias, does not (or cannot) address
changes in behaviors over time, does not correct for endogeneity of health behaviors
and cancer outcomes, or does not include relevant control variables (demographics,
age, physical limitations) in examining health behaviors and cancer outcomes. Our
study addresses these issues.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the
data. In section 3.3, we present a framework that links breast cancer diagnosis and
risky lifestyle choices. We discuss the estimation methodology in section 3.4. We
present the results and conclusions in sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
3.2 Data
Our research uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID
is a longitudinal study that started in 1968 with over 18,000 individuals from 5,000
households in the United States and now includes more than 22,000 individuals
from over 9,000 households. One person per family, designated as the head, is
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interviewed regularly and answers questions about himself, his spouse (or his long-
term female cohabitator) and his family members.7 Families from the core sample
are interviewed biennially.8 Every wave contains information about employment,
income, education, wealth, marriage, childbearing, and various other topics. We
choose to use the PSID data set because of its longitudinal structure which allows
us to follow the same individuals and their corresponding behaviors across time.
Further, these data are collected not only for breast cancer patients but also for
persons without a history of cancer. This allows us to make comparisons between
breast cancer patients and healthy individuals.
We use data from 7 waves from 1999, when cancer outcomes were rst recorded,
until 2011. We keep female respondents, aged 15 and older, because breast cancer
almost exclusively a¤ects women. Our starting sample consists of 9; 447 women for
a total of 46; 061 persons-years. Table 3.1 provides an overview of our missing values
analysis. First, we drop individuals who have missing values for questions related
to demographics,9 cancer condition and breast cancer condition. We lose a total
of 310 persons and are left with a sample of 9; 137 persons and 42; 875 persons-
years. Secondly, we use this sample as a new starting point and drop missing values
depending on our interest. For our analysis on smoking behaviors, we only drop
observations missing for questions related to smoking habits. Similarly, when looking
at exercise behaviors, we only drop missing values related to exercise habits. This
is shown in the bottom panel of Table 3.1.10
Table 3.1: Missing Values Analysis
Starting Starting # Person-Years #Persons
Variables of Interest # Person-Years # Persons Dropped Dropped
Explanatory Variables 46061 9447
Demographics1 2999 238
Cancer Condition 37 6
Breast Cancer Condition 150 66
Dependent Variables 42875 9137
Smoking Habits 39 1
Drinking Habits 55 0
Exercising Habits 251 10
1 Demographics corresponds to age, race, education level, and income.
Table 3.2 reports demographic summary statistics and Table 3.3 health behaviors
7The head can be a man or a woman. Because it is more often the husband, we use the masculine
form to refer to it.
8As mentioned, the head of the household is often the husband, who will provide answers to for
questions related to his spouse. The literature has however shown that spouses have very careful
perceptions of the time spent by the other spouse on di¤erent activities (Stern, 2003). Similarly, it
has been shown (see for example Kolonel et al., 1977; Campbell et al., 2007) that spouses provide
complete information for various lifestyle behaviors of their spouse such as smoking and drinking
behaviors.
9This corresponds to missing values for age, race, education level, or income.
10For example, our analysis of exercising behaviorsis based on a sample of 9; 137  10 = 9; 127
persons and 42; 875  251 = 42; 624 persons-years.
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summary statistics of our sample. The PSID was initially designed to study the
Table 3.2: Demographics Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 44.577 15.993
White 0.579 0.494
Black 0.307 0.461
Married 0.638 0.481
Employed 0.637 0.481
Has Children 0.810 0.392
Highest Education Degree:
No Degree 0.172 0.377
High School 0.415 0.493
University 0.325 0.469
Post Graduate 0.087 0.282
Taxable Income:
< $ 20,000 0.196 0.397
$ 20,000 - $ 50,000 0.247 0.431
> $ 50,000 0.557 0.497
Diagnosed with:
Cancer 0.084 0.277
Breast Cancer 0.021 0.143
Number of Persons-Years: 42875
dynamics of income and poverty. The oversampling of families who were poor in the
late 1960s resulted in a substantial subsample of African Americans (PSID, 2013). In
our sample, we also have a large proportion of African American respondents (30%).
One of our main interests is the health status of our respondents and, in partic-
ular, their cancer status. As can be seen in Table 3.2, 8:1% of the sample have been
diagnosed with cancer and 2% with breast cancer. In our sample, 25% of all cancers
diagnosed are breast cancer which matches national breast cancer statistics (Amer-
ican Cancer Society, 2007). As can be seen in Table 3.3, approximately 53% of our
respondents ever drink alcoholic beverages, which is slightly below the national av-
erage of 55%11 as reported by the National Center for Health Statistics (Schoenborn
and Adams, 2010) for the period 2005-2007.12 As the survey questions concerning al-
cohol consumption were not consistently worded across waves,13 we report statistics
11They report the proportion of current drinkers, which refer to adults who have had at least 12
drinks in their lifetime and at least one drink in the past year.
12Looking at these numbers disaggregated by race, we nd in our sample that 61% of the white
respondents ever drink alcoholic beverages and 43% of the African American. This also match the
numbers of the National Center for Health Statistics which report 59% and 40% of current drinkers
for white and African American respectively.
13For the rst three waves (1999, 2001 and 2003), people are asked how many drinks they have
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Table 3.3: Health Behaviors Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. #Person-Years
Smoking Status 42836
Current Smoker 0.183 0.387
Cigarette Consumption 7743
Smokes 1 to 9 cig/day 0.335 0.472
Smokes 10 to 19 cig/day 0.360 0.480
Smokes 20 or more cig/day 0.305 0.460
Alcohol 42820
Drinks Alcohol 0.527 0.499
Frequency of Alcohol Consumption1 26012
Never drinks 0.459 0.498
Less than 1 drink per month 0.157 0.364
One drink per month 0.112 0.316
Several drinks per month 0.085 0.279
One drink per week 0.091 0.288
Several drinks per week 0.073 0.260
Drinks everyday 0.022 0.147
Exercise 42624
Never 0.162 0.368
1 or 2 times/week 0.181 0.385
3 to 6 times/week 0.294 0.456
7 times/week 0.326 0.469
8 to 14 times/week 0.016 0.125
More than 14 times/week 0.021 0.143
1 This only considers waves 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011.
only for the four last waves (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011).14
Table 3.4 presents details about respondents with breast cancer. Individuals in
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Individuals with Breast Cancer
Variable Mean Std. Dev. # Person-Years
Years Since BC Diagnosis 11.441 12.155 873
Age at BC Diagnosis 50.507 14.997 889
Currently1
Cured 0.695 0.461 491
In Remission 0.189 0.392 491
In Treatment 0.116 0.321 491
1 These questions are asked starting only in 2005.
the sample responded to the following question: Has a doctor ever told you that you
on average per day: In the last year, on average, how often did you have any alcohol to drink?
Would you say, less than one a month, about once a month, several times a month, about once a
week, several times a week, or every day?. For the four last waves , the categories were changed
and the questions about daily consumption referred to days when respondents drink : In the last
year, on the days you drank, about how many drinks did you have?.
14In later regressions, we also only use data from years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, when looking
at alcohol behaviors.
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have or had cancer or a malignant tumor?. If the respondent answers yes, follow-
up questions were asked regarding the type of cancer and the stage. The majority
of our respondents are cured15 while approximately 12% are in treatment.16 As
can be seen in Table 3.4, the sample average age for a breast cancer diagnosis is
approximately 50. However, it is important to consider that there is a censoring
issue in these data in the sense that they do not contain information on respondents
who were no longer alive at the survey date. The concern is that individuals with
cancer who have not succumbed to the disease may not be representative of those
who are diagnosed. In particular, there are two main sources of bias.
First, as mentioned, we observe someone with cancer only if they are still alive.
If this were the only source of bias, then the data would contain women who are
on average older. Indeed, women who are diagnosed at younger ages have a higher
mortality rate. Specically, women diagnosed between 25 and 29 years old have an
overall 5-year relative survival rate of approximately 72%. This rate increases to 80%
for women diagnosed between 35 and 39 years old, and to 84%   86% for women
aged between 45 and 80 years at their diagnosis (Anders et al., 2009). Further, the
longer people have lived with breast cancer, the lower is the probability they will die
from breast cancer. For example, the 5-year relative survival probability is between
80 and 90% at the time of the diagnostic for local and regional breast cancers.17 It
increases to between 85 and 96% after 5 years survived since the diagnosis for these
same types of cancer (Merrill and Hunter, 2010). Therefore, this source of censoring
leads to data that contains an upward bias in the average years of survival.
Second, obviously we observe someone with cancer in the data only if they have
been diagnosed prior to the time of the survey. Since some women in the sample
without cancer will be diagnosed in the future, the mean reported age of diagnosis
is lower.18 According to Breastcancer.org, a twenty year old woman has a 0.06%
probability of developing invasive breast cancer in the next 10 years. This probability
increases as the woman ages: it is equal to 2.31% for women of age 50 and 3.84% for
women of age 70. In our sample, although a woman does not report having breast
cancer at the time of the survey, this does not imply she will not develop breast
cancer in the future.
In Table 3.5, we report prevalence of breast cancer diagnosis by demographic
groups.19 The proportion of respondents having breast cancer is larger among whites
than among individuals of other races. This is in line with national statistics, which
15Cancers is considered as curedwhen doctors cannot detect cancer ve years after diagnosis
(American Cancer Society, 2006).
16Questions about whether the respondent is currently in treatment, in remission, or has been
cured are asked only starting in 2005. The sample size is therefore smaller.
17In our data set, we cannot tell the stage at diagnosis of the cancer. But local and regional
stages are the most common stages (Merrill and Hunter, 2010).
18See appendix for more details.
19There are some women in the sample who have breast cancer but have not yet been diagnosed.
Diagnosis requires going to the doctor and women without adequate insurance are going to be less
likely to go to the doctor. However, given that the woman does not know she has breast cancer
this will not inuence our results.
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Table 3.5: Proportion of Breast Cancer Diagnoses Disaggregated by Demographics
Proportion of Breast Cancer Diagnoses
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Person-Years p-value1
Race 0.000
White 0.025 0.156 24814
Black 0.016 0.126 13166
Other 0.012 0.107 4895
Age 0.000
Younger than 30 0.000 0.019 8643
Between 30 and 59 0.016 0.126 27012
60 and older 0.062 0.242 7220
Family Composition 0.000
Have Children 0.023 0.149 34732
Childless 0.012 0.110 8143
Age at First Child 0.034
Younger than 35 0.023 0.150 33444
35 and older 0.016 0.124 1288
Education 0.042
No Degree School 0.023 0.150 7372
High School 0.022 0.147 17800
Associate or Bachelor 0.018 0.135 13955
>Bachelor 0.018 0.134 3748
Family Income 0.000
<20,000$ 0.029 0.168 8404
20,000$ & <50,000$ 0.016 0.127 10578
>50,000$ 0.020 0.139 23893
1 The reported p-values are from multivariate tests on equal means.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 3.6: Proportion of Breast Cancer Diagnoses Disaggregated by Health Behaviors
Proportion of Breast Cancer Diagnoses
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Person-Years p-value1
Smoking Status 0.000
Current Smoker 0.014 0.116 7852
Former Smoker 0.036 0.186 9026
Never Smoked 0.018 0.132 25929
Cigarette Consumption 0.037
Smokes 1 to 9 cig/day 0.010 0.102 2592
Smokes 10 to 19 cig/day 0.012 0.108 2789
Smokes 20 or more cig/day 0.019 0.137 2362
Alcohol 0.000
Drinks Alcohol 0.018 0.133 22561
Never Drinks Alcohol 0.024 0.152 20259
Frequency of Alcohol Consumption2 0.058
Less than 1 drink per month 0.019 0.135 4082
One drink per month 0.017 0.128 2920
Several drinks per month 0.014 0.117 2221
One drink per week 0.017 0.129 2376
Several drinks per week 0.025 0.157 1894
Drinks everyday 0.031 0.174 574
Exercise 0.000
Never 0.032 0.177 6901
1 or 2 times/week 0.019 0.135 7710
3 to 6 times/week 0.019 0.136 12550
7 times/week 0.018 0.134 13896
8 to 14 times/week 0.012 0.108 673
More than 14 times/week 0.020 0.141 894
1 The reported p-values are from multivariate tests on equal means.
2 This only considers waves 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
indicate that white women have the highest risk of getting breast cancer (American
Cancer Society, 2005). Childless women and women whose rst birth is after age
35 have an increased risk of developing breast cancer (Britt et al., 2007), which is
also reected in our data. However, conditional on having children, the proportion
of breast cancer patients is larger for women who had their child at 35 years old or
later. This is consistent with the fact that a higher age at rst full-term pregnancy
is considered as a risk factor for breast cancer (for example, Kelsey, 1993).
Next we examine relationships between risky health behaviors and breast can-
cer prevalence. Table 3.6 displays breast cancer diagnosis among individuals with
di¤ering smoking, drinking, and exercise habits. The rst few rows show that the
proportion of breast cancer patients is the largest among former smokers. Among
smokers, breast cancer prevalence is the highest for respondents who smoke more
than 19 cigarettes per day.
Regarding alcohol consumption behaviors, prevalence is lower in the group of
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respondents who do drink alcohol. Among those who drink, breast cancer prevalence
is the highest for individuals who drink everyday.20
The bottom panel of table 3.6 presents statistics for physical activity. The re-
spondents were asked about weekly exercise frequency for heavy and light workouts.21
Specically, they were asked How often do you participate in vigorous/light physical
activity or sports.A problem with this wording is that there is no information about
the measure of time spent by a person doing physical activity.22 In our analysis, we
rst regroup light and heavy physical activities into one variable called exercise.
Secondly, we dene the following six categories: no exercise (neither light nor heavy),
exercise one to two times a week, exercise three to six times a week, exercise seven
times a week, exercise eight to fourteen times a week, and exercise more than fourteen
times a week.23 The proportion of breast cancer patients is the largest among people
who never exercise, while it is the lowest among people who exercise between 8 and
14 times per week. The main point that emerges from table 3.6 is that breast cancer
incidence di¤ers with the degree an individual engages in various lifestyle behaviors.
In the next sections, we examine this in more detail.
3.3 Model
As we discussed in the Section 3.1, many papers in the medical literature examine
the inuence of lifestyle behaviors on breast cancer diagnosis and outcomes. In this
section, we present a model that links breast cancer diagnosis to lifestyle choices. In
our framework, a women (indexed by i) makes a lifestyle choice (indexed by l) in
each period (indexed by t), where the lifestyle behaviors may be inuenced by breast
cancer diagnosis. The lifestyle choices concern how much to smoke, how much to
consume alcohol, and how much to engage in physical activity. Let yilt be a latent
variable measuring the continuous quantity of lifestyle activity l chosen by individual
i at time t. Specically, the baseline model is given by
yilt = 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l + bitl +Xitl + il + "ilt; (3.1)
where bit is a binary indicator for whether i is diagnosed with breast cancer at time
t, il is a person/behavior-specic random e¤ect, and "ilt is an idiosyncratic e¤ect.
TheXit vector includes explanatory person-specic variables such is age, her marital
status, whether she has children, her income, and her education level. Lifestyle choices
20As the survey questions concerning alcohol consumption were not consistently worded across
waves, we report statistics only for the four last waves (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011).
21Specically, heavy exercise refers to heavy housework, aerobics, running, swimming, bicycling
or similar that causes heavy sweating or large increases in breathing or heart rate(PSID, 2005).
Light exercise includes walking, dancing, gardening, golng, bowling or similar that causes only
light sweating or slight to moderate increases in breathing or heart rate(PSID, 2005).
22See the discussion in Berniell et al. (2013).
23Further, some persons report extreme values which could indicate some misunderstanding of
the question.
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exhibit persistence, which may be due to addiction (such as smoking and drinking
alcohol) or to habit persistence (such as exercise).24 Therefore, we allow individual
is lifestyle choices at time t to depend on whether she participated in that behavior
in the immediate past 1(yilt 1 > 0).
We should note that each behavior is reported in the data as a bracketed variable.
We dene m = 1 as not participating in the activity and let the quantity of activity
increase as m increases where
yilt = m i¤ lm  yilt < lm+1, m = 1; 2; ::;Ml:
Assume that l1 =  1, l2 = 0, and lMl+1 =1.
Given that lifestyle choices are persistent, we estimate this model using a panel
dataset. To control for endogenous initial conditions (à la Heckman, 1981), we specify
the initial period values
yil0 = Cil + bi0l +Xi0l + il + "il0; (3.2)
"iltj(X i; yil;t 1; :::yil0; il)  N(0; 2"); (3.3)
where X i denotes the mean over time of the explanatory variables (excluding the
year xed e¤ects) and Ci is a set of variables a¤ecting only initial choices. For
smoking behaviors, these include age when i started smoking.25 Unfortunately, the
PSID does not contain any information on the age at which respondents started
drinking or exercising. For these lifestyle choices, we include the level of drinking or
exercising behavior observed in the rst period of the data as an initial condition. In
this approach, there may be a concern about the initial value of yil0. One possibility
is to treat it as nonrandom, which would imply that il and yil0 are independent.
However, il and yil0 may not be independent, so we follow Wooldridge (2005) that
builds on Chamberlain (1984) and specify the density of the xed e¤ect conditional
on the initial condition as
il = 0 + 1yil0 +X i2 + ail; ailj
 
yil0; X i
  N(0; 2a): (3.4)
As discussed in Wooldridge (2005), the xed e¤ects can then be integrated out
to yield the likelihood function of the random e¤ects Probit model with time-t,
observation-i explanatory variables: (Xit; yil;t 1; :::yil0; X i).
24Economists do not distinguish between habit-formation and addiction; both are modeled as
consumption decisions today a¤ecting the utility function in the future.
25For those who do not smoke, the initial condition is set to zero.
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3.4 Estimation Methodology
We rst discuss the estimation methodology treating the three models corresponding
to the three activities of interest separately. Using equation (3.1), dene
Yilt (i) = y

ilt   "ilt
= 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l + bitl +Xitl + il
as the deterministic part of yilt after conditioning on il for t  1, and, using equation
(3.2), dene
Yil0 (i) = y

il0   "il0:
The vector of parameters to estimate for model l is  = (l; l; l; el; l; l), and the
log likelihood contribution for i is
Lil = log
Z " TY
t=0
MlY
m=1
ilm (il)
1(yilt=m) d (il)
#
ilm (il) =  [lm+1   Yilt (il)]   [lm   Yilt (il)] :
The log likelihood function Ll =
P
i Lil can be maximized in Stata using a straight-
forward quadrature method (Butler and Mo¢ tt, 1982), while more complex error
structures probably would require use of simulation methods (Stern, 1997).
One might be concerned that the inclusion of the random e¤ect il in equations
(3.1) and (3.2) does not su¢ ciently capture variation that would be incorporated
with a richer covariance structure across time, behaviors, and/or individuals. For
example, dening
Vilt = 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l + bitl1 + bit (1  bit) l2
+bit (1  bit) 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l3 +Xitl
as the non-random part of equation (3.1), a much more exible error structure would
be represented as
yilt = Vilt + ult + il + "ilt; (3.5)
ut  iidN (0;
u) ;
i  iidN (0;
) ;
"it  iidN (0;
")
(with appropriate identifying conditions on covariance matrices) or
yilt = 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l + bitl1 + bit (1  bit) l2 (3.6)
+bit (1  bit) 1
 
yilt 1 > 0

l3 +Xitl +
KX
k=1
'lkk +
KX
k=1
'lk il + "ilt
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where
 
'; '

are factor loadings associated with factors (; ) (e.g., Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzúa, 2006; Conti, Heckman, and Urzúa, 2010; Dean et al., 2015, 2016)
or a specication that emphasizes more general forms of serial correlation. While the
parameters of any such structure could be estimated using simulation methods (e.g.,
Dean et al., 2015, 2016), they would still be signicantly more expensive to estimate.
Alternatively, one could estimate the model in equations (3.1) and (3.2), and
then test for more sophisticated error structures using Pseudo-Lagrange Multiplier
tests (e.g., Checkovich and Stern, 2002; Friedberg and Stern 2014; Dean et al., 2016).
Details are provided in the appendix.
3.5 Results
We estimate three random-e¤ects ordered probit models and our results indicate that
breast cancer diagnosis (and recency) of diagnosis impacts lifestyle choices. However,
the impact of diagnosis has a di¤erent e¤ect on smoking, drinking, and exercising
behavior and the impact also depends upon the recency of the diagnosis.
We rst start by discussing the impact of breast cancer diagnosis on smoking
behavior. We consider four categories of daily smoking intensity: (i) does not smoke,
(ii) smokes fewer than 10 cigarettes a day; (iii) smokes between 10 and 19 cigarettes
a day, (iv) smokes more than 20 daily, which is more than a pack of cigarettes.
Table 3.7 presents random-e¤ects ordered probit estimates where the explanatory
variables include smoking behavior in the previous year, demographics, as well as
breast cancer variables. The rst two columns of Table 3.7 indicate that whether
an individual has been diagnosed with breast cancer has no signicant impact on
smoking behavior conditional on past behavior and demographic variables. Column
(2) includes controls for initial conditions as outlined in Section 3.3. However, as
columns (3) and (4) indicate, if the woman was diagnosed with breast cancer less
than ve years ago she will signicantly decrease her smoking behavior ( 0:289)
where this e¤ect is robust to including initial conditions (column (4), 0:326). The
di¤erential impact of the time of diagnosis on smoking behavior could arise from a few
sources. First, the individual may react to a diagnosis by curbing unhealthy habits
such as smoking, but this e¤ect may deteriorate over time as the individual survives
past the initial stages. Second, the woman may be undergoing treatment which
makes smoking more di¢ cult in the short run due to lack of energy, for example.
The signs and signicance of the control variables are intuitive and in-line with
results from other studies. First, past smokers are more likely to be current smokers
and the signicant positive e¤ect persists after controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity (in columns (2) and (4)). Our nding is consistent with numerous studies that
have shown that smoking exhibits true state dependence (i.e., the e¤ect is signicant
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity). Our results indicate white individu-
als smoke more than black individuals. We also nd that married individuals smoke
less than those who are not married as do women with a higher education relative
to other education categories. Finally, we nd that individuals with lower incomes
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Table 3.7: Random E¤ects Ordered Probit Regressions for Smoking
Dependent Variable: Ordered Variable for Number of Cigarettes Smoked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Behavior
Smoker Last Period 2.432 1.646 2.433 1.648
(0.030) (0.045) (0.030) (0.045)
Breast Cancer Variables
Diagnosed with Breast Cancer -0.096 -0.150
(0.098) (0.142)
Recent Breast Cancer Diagnosis -0.289 -0.326+
(0.140) (0.171)
Other Controls
Age
Aged in 30s, 40s, or 50s -0.028 0.172 -0.027 0.172
(0.033) (0.051) (0.033) (0.051)
Aged 60 or Older -0.519 -0.160 -0.520 -0.164
(0.051) (0.103) (0.051) (0.103)
Race
White 0.474 0.701 0.473 0.700
(0.053) (0.084) (0.053) (0.084)
Black 0.081 0.196 0.080 0.195
(0.055) (0.088) (0.055) (0.088)
Family Situation
Married -0.227 -0.259 -0.227 -0.259
(0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.039)
Have Children 0.004 -0.032 0.004 -0.032
(0.042) (0.063) (0.042) (0.063)
Highest Education
High School -0.241 -0.352 -0.241 -0.352
(0.036) (0.052) (0.036) (0.052)
University Degree -0.505 -0.700 -0.505 -0.700
(0.042) (0.061) (0.042) (0.060)
Post Graduate -0.896 -1.268 -0.895 -1.266
(0.075) (0.107) (0.075) (0.107)
Income
Less than 20K 0.102 0.109 0.102 0.109
(0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042)
Between 20 and 50K 0.095 0.106 0.095 0.105
(0.031) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038)
Initial Conditions Included no yes no yes
Number of Observation 33,967 33,942 33,967 33,942
Number of Individuals 8,019 8,010 8,019 8,010
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
All regressions include cutt o¤ points, individual heterogeneity variance and year xed e¤ects.
The initial conditions specications inlcude the mean over time of all time varying regressors.
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(under 50; 000$) smoke more than higher income women.
Table 3.8 presents the results of a random e¤ects ordered probit regression for
number of alcoholic drinks, where the dependent variable is ordered according to:
(i) non-drinker, (ii) women who have on average drink at most once a week, and
(iii) women who on average drink more than one time a week. As with smoking,
our results indicate that past drinking behavior is a positive signicant indicator of
current drinking behavior, and this e¤ect remains after controlling for initial condi-
tions in columns (2) and (4). However, in contrast to smoking behavior women do
not change their alcohol consumption after a breast cancer diagnosis regardless of
when the diagnosis was made.
The control variables indicate that women aged 60 or older drink less, but that
white women drink more than black women. In addition, we nd that married
individuals drink less often, as do those with children. Finally, drinking more often
is more likely among those with higher education relative to other groups and among
those with a larger income.
We present the results of the random-e¤ects ordered probit for exercise frequency
in Table 3.9. Exercise frequency is based on number of exercise sessions per week as
discussed in Section 3.2 where the categories are number of times per week participate
in exercise (i) no times, (ii) 1-2 times, (iii) 3-6 times, (iv), 7 times, (v) 6-14 times, and
(vi) more than 14 times. As the results in columns (1) and (2) show a diagnosis of
breast cancer signicantly impacts the amount of exercise in a negative way. Perhaps
this result is not so surprising given that women often undergo treatment after a
breast cancer diagnosis that can weaken them and make it more di¢ cult to engage
in extra physical activity. The results in columns (3) and (4) show that women
also decrease their amount of physical activity after a recent diagnosis, which is not
surprising.
The other control variables indicate that the older the woman is the less physical
activity she participates in. The results also show that being white is associated
with higher levels of physical activity. We also nd married women engage in more
physical activity as well relative to non-married women. Furthermore, the higher the
level of education the woman has the more she engages in weekly physical activity.
Finally, individuals with income less than $20,000 engage in less exercise relative to
individuals with income between $20,000 and $50,000.
3.6 Conclusions
According to the National Breast Cancer Foundation, one in eight US women are
impacted by breast cancer.26 We use longitudinal data from the PSID, starting
from 1999 to 2011, to examine to what extent women who are diagnosed with breast
cancer change their (potentially risky) lifestyle choices. We nd that women who were
26http://www.nationalbreastcancer.org/about-breast-cancer/?utm_campaign=Grants%20Education&utm_source=Google&utm_medium=CPC&gclid=CjwKEAjw7svABRCi_KPzoPr53QoSJAABSvxfpknK1Qx8sVFl-
9xAqvrVuqQuEIE-ewB6XWqWwWdTDxoCMK3w_wcB
Referenced on October 28, 2016
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Table 3.8: Random E¤ects Ordered Probit Regressions for Alcohol Consumption
Dependent variable: Ordered Variable for Number of Alcoholic Drinks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Behavior
Number of Drinks Last Period 0.220 0.051 0.220 0.051
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Breast Cancer Variables
Diagnosed with Breast Cancer -0.079 -0.101
(0.136) (0.142)
Recent Breast Cancer Diagnosis -0.011 -0.087
(0.180) (0.186)
Other Controls
Age
Aged in 30s, 40s, or 50s 0.013 0.104 0.0116 0.103
(0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050)
Aged 60 or Older -0.394 -0.163 -0.398 -0.167
(0.067) (0.070) (0.067) (0.070)
Race
White 0.849 0.716 0.848 0.715
(0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.076)
Black 0.137+ 0.148+ 0.136+ 0.148+
(0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.081)
Family Situation
Married -0.192 -0.151 -0.192 -0.151
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Have Children -0.474 -0.391 -0.474 -0.391
(0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061)
Highest Education
High School 0.465 0.467 0.465 0.467
(0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063)
University Degree 0.804 0.802 0.804 0.802
(0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.067)
Post Graduate 1.008 1.017 1.009 1.017
(0.082) (0.085) (0.082) (0.085)
Income
Less than 20K -0.072 -0.056 -0.072 -0.056
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
Between 20 and 50K -0.062 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Initial Conditions Included no yes no yes
Number of Observations 18,082 18,036 18,082 18,036
Number of Individuals 7,175 7,147 7,175 7,147
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
All regressions include cut o¤ points, individual heterogeneity variance, and year xed e¤ects.
The initial conditions specications include the mean over time of all time varying regressors.
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Table 3.9: Random E¤ects Ordered Probit Regressions for Exercising
Dependent Variable: Ordered Variable for Exercise Frequency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Behavior
Exercise Frequency Last Period 0.173 0.126 0.174 0.126
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Breast Cancer Variables
Diagnosed with Breast Cancer -0.144 -0.167
(0.051) (0.052)
Recent Breast Cancer Diagnosis -0.138 -0.156
(0.0698) (0.0705)
Other Controls Age
Aged in 30s, 40s, or 50s -0.134 -0.147 -0.135 -0.148
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Aged 60 or Older -0.381 -0.392 -0.386 -0.399
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Race
White 0.155 0.134 0.154 0.133
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Black -0.062 -0.066 -0.063 -0.067
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Family Situation
Married 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.056
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Have Children 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Highest Education
High School 0.113 0.103 0.113 0.103
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
University Degree 0.163 0.154 0.163 0.154
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Post Graduate 0.198 0.199 0.198 0.199
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Income
Less than 20K 0.048 0.039+ 0.048 0.039+
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Between 20 and 50K 0.064 0.057 0.064 0.057
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Initial Conditions Included no yes no yes
Number of Observations 33,851 33,851 33,851 33,851
Number of Individuals 8,009 8,009 8,009 8,009
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
All regressions include cut o¤ points, individual heterogeneity variance and year xed e¤ects.
The initial conditions specications include the mean over time of all time varying regressors.
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recently diagnosed with breast cancer smoke less, which some research has shown is a
contributing factor to breast cancer. In contrast to smoking behavior women do not
change their alcohol consumption after a breast cancer diagnosis regardless of when
the diagnosis was made. Furthermore, a diagnosis of breast cancer signicantly
impacts the amount of exercise in a negative way. Perhaps this result is not so
surprising given that women often undergo treatment after a breast cancer diagnosis
that can weaken them and make it more di¢ cult to engage in extra physical activity.
Our ndings allow us to learn more about the trade-o¤s women are willing to make
between participating in unhealthy (but enjoyable) habits and increasing ones life
expectancy.
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Appendix
Lagrange Multiplier Tests
Consider the alternative model in equation (3.5). Its log likelihood contribution for
family n is
Ln = log
Z "Y
i
TY
t=0
nit (n) dF (n)
#
(3.7)
where
n = (u
0
n; e
0
n)
0
is the Nn  1 vector of unobserved heterogeneity errors, Nn = L (1 + n), F (n) is
its joint distribution function,
nit (n) =
Z
  
Z Y
l
1 (lynilt  ynilt (n) < lynilt+1) dG ("nit)
=
Z lyni1t+1 Wni1t(n)
lyni1t Wni1t(n)
 
Z lyniLt+1 WniLt(n)
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n)
dG ("nit) ;
Wnilt (n) = Vnilt + unl + enil;
and G ("nit) is the joint distribution of "nit. Since we can write the log likelihood, we
can perform a Lagrange Multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan, 1982). However, the
score statistics with respect to 
u, 
e, and 
" are quite complicated and would not
easily be produced by Stata.27
However, we can consider carefully chosen functions of generalized residuals from
estimation of equation (3.1) that should behave di¤erently under
H0 : 
u = 0;
e =
0BBB@
e1 0    0
0 e2    0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    eL
1CCCA ;
" = I
27They involve di¤erentiation of multiple integrals where the Choleski decompositions of the
covariance matrices are in each of the limits of integrations and the integrand is a L-dimension
joint normal density function.
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than under its general alternative.
Let
rnil
T1
= E"nil j ynil
= Ee [E"nil j lynilt   (Vnilt + enil)  "nilt < lynilt+1   (Vnilt + enil)]
= Ee

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 [lynilt+1   (Vnilt + enil)]   [lynilt   (Vnilt + enil)]

be the vector of generalized residuals for i associated with the T choices over behavior
l. These residuals can be simulated as
ernil = 1
2K
KX
k=1
X
a= 1;1
R
 
aeknil

where
R (e) =
 [lynilt+1   (Vnilt + e)]   [lynilt   (Vnilt + e)]
 [lynilt+1   (Vnilt + e)]   [lynilt   (Vnilt + e)]
and eknil is a draw from its estimated density. Consider
Su1 =
X
l
X
n
X
i
X
j 6=i
rnilrnjl

or
Su2 =
X
l
X
k
X
n
X
i
X
j 6=i
rnilrnjk

where
rnil =
1
T
X
t
ernilt
If 
u = 0, then, since family members are behaving independently, Su1 and Su2 should
be close to 0, while, if
u 6= 0, then both should deviate from 0. Su1 should have power
against the diagonal elements of 
u deviating from 0 but not o¤-diagonal elements
deviating from 0, while Su2 should have power against the general alternative. Next,
consider
Se =
X
l
X
j 6=l
X
n
X
i
rnilrnij
 :
If 
e is diagonal, then, since individual/behavior e¤ects are independent, Se should
be close to 0, while, if 
e is not diagonal, then Se should deviate from 0. Finally,
consider
S" =
X
l
X
n
X
i
er0nilernil
If 
" = I, then, since idiosyncratic e¤ects are independent, S" should be close to
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0, while, if 
" 6= I, then Se should deviate from 0. One can easily simulate the
distribution of each statistic under H0 to pick critical values for each test.
The same set of test statistics can be used for the model in equation (3.6). This
is so because the extra errors in the specication imply the same correlations across
family members and behaviors. In fact the model in equation (3.6) can be written
the form of equation (3.5).
Age at diagnosis
Let ait be the age of i in year t. What is reported in the data isR t
t at (at   t+ s)S (t  s) f (at   t+ s) dsR t
t at S (t  s) f (at   t+ s) ds
where f () is the density of the age of cancer diagnosis (conditional on being diag-
nosed) and S () is the survivor function from day of diagnosis. What you report it
says (and what you would like it to say) isZ 1
0
sf (s) ds: (3.8)
There are two main sources of bias:
1. In the data, we observe someone with cancer only if they are still alive; thus
the inclusion of S (). If this were the only source of bias, then we would over-
estimate the average age because women who were diagnosed at a young age
had a smaller chance of being alive at t.
2. In the data, we observe someone with cancer only if they have been diagnosed
prior to their age at t. Since some women in the sample without cancer will be
diagnosed in the future, the e¤ect of this e¤ect lowers the mean reported age
of diagnosis.
One might want to estimate the object in equation (3.8) using our data fai; ci; bigi
where ai is sample person is age, ci is an indicator for whether she has cancer, and bi
is the age she was diagnosed if ci = 1. Given an estimate bS () of the survivor function
from some other source, one could estimate f () (or parameters associated with a
parametric assumption about the form of f ()) by maximizing the log likelihood
function,
L =
X
i
ci log
 
f (bi) bS (ai   bi)R
f (b) bS (ai   b) db
!
+ (1  ci) log (1  F (ai))
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where F () is the distribution function associated with density f (). One might
want to generalize by conditioning f () on a reasonable (and small) set of exogenous
covariates.
Marginal E¤ects
We follow Stern (1991) to compute the marginal e¤ects of the parameter estimates.
Specically, let
g (yi ) = xi + ui
where g () is a monotone-increasing function, g (yi ) is a latent measure of some
outcome variable, and ui  iidN (0; 1). Assume that
yi = k i¤ ck  yi < ck+1
for k = 0; 1; ::; K + 1. Dene  0 =  1,  1 = 0, K+1 = 1, and  k = g (ck) for
k = 2; 3; ::;K. Assume that we observe fyi; xigni=1 and fckgK+1k=0 . This model is an
ordered probit model with log likelihood function
L =
nX
i=1
KX
k=0
1 (yi =  k) log [ ( k+1   xi)   ( k   xi)] ;
which is maximized over  = (;  2;  3; ::; K). The ML estimates are consistent,
e¢ cient, and asymptotically normal. The g () function is identied only at ck 8k.
We can t a spline in slopes or a higher-order spline to the points, fck;  kgK+1k=0 in
order to translate values of g (yi ) = xi + ui into units of y

i . Also, we can evaluate
E (xi + ui j  k   xi  ui <  k+1   xi)
= xi + E (ui j  k   xi  ui <  k+1   xi)
= xi +
 ( k+1   xi)   ( k   xi)
 ( k+1   xi)   ( k   xi)
and then plug into our spline estimate of g 1 () to predictyi .

Chapter 4
Advertising and Life Satisfaction:
Cross-National Evidence on One
Million Europeans
joint project with Michelle Sovinsky, 1 Eugenio Proto, 2 and Andrew J. Oswald 3
4.1 Introduction
Advertising plays a prominent role in modern society. Although it is not known
how much advertising a typical citizen witnesses, one modern study by Speers et
al. (2011) concluded for the United States that on prime-time television the brand
names of food, beverages and restaurants appeared approximately 35,000 times in
one year. Coca Cola products, for example, were seen 198 times by the average child
and 269 times by the average adolescent. These inuences appear to be strengthening
through time. Another study by Crowling and Poolsombat (2007) has documented
a 4-fold increase in real advertising per-capita in the US over 5 decades.
The links between advertising and human well-being are not fully understood.
E¤ects might operate along two broad channels. First, one way to conceive of adver-
tising is as a force for good. Advertising informs. It may therefore promote human
welfare by allowing people to make better choices about the right products for them.
Second, an alternative way to conceive of advertising is as a force that creates dis-
satisfaction and stimulates potentially infeasible desires. If correct, that view, which
dates back more than 100 years to the writings of Thorstein Veblen (1904), would
imply that advertising might reduce net human welfare by unduly raising the con-
1University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany and Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London, EC1V 3PZ, UK
2University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK and IZA Institute for the Study of Labor,
Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9, D-53113 Bonn, Germany.
3University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK and IZA Institute for the Study of Labor,
Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9, D-53113 Bonn, Germany.
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sumption aspirations of human beings. Since Veblen, many writings have worried
about the possibility of, and in some cases found small-scale evidence for, negative
e¤ects of advertising upon peoples well-being (Richins, 1995; Easterlin and Crim-
mins, 1991; Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Sirgy et al., 1998); Dittmar et al., 2014;
Frey et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2009), and a large literature exists particularly on the
possible detrimental e¤ects upon children (Andreyeva et al., 2011; Borzekowski and
Robinson, 2001; Buijzen and Valkenburg, 2003A; Buizjen and Valkenburg, 2003B;
Opree et al, 2012).
At the national level, it is not known which of these two forces one benecial
and one detrimental is dominant. The current study, which might be viewed as a
contribution to the behavioral science of human happiness, is an attempt to address
the question. Even the now-large modern literature on the social science of well-being
(Easterlin, 2003; Radcli¤, 2001; Diener, 2013; Layard , 2005; Dunn et al. , 2008;
Clark and Oswald, 1996; Fowler and Christakis, 2008; Graham et al., 2004; Gilbert,
2006; Stone et al, 2010; Steptoe and Wardle, 2011, De Neve and Oswald, 2012) has
so far paid no attention to the topic of advertising. A small number of national
variables have been shown to inuence national well-being in xed-e¤ects equations.
In particular, the generosity of the welfare state and various macroeconomic variables
such as unemployment appear to impact national well-being (Di Tella et al., 2001;
Di Tella et al., 2003; Radcli¤, 2013). The present study examines and provides
evidence of  links between national advertising and national well-being. Using
longitudinal information on countries (built up from pooled cross-sectional surveys),
it nds that rises and falls in advertising are followed, a small number of years later,
by falls and rises in national life-satisfaction. The results thus reveal an inverse
connection between advertising levels and the later well-being of nations.
To perform the statistical analysis, we take a sample of slightly over 900,000 ran-
domly sampled European citizens, who report information on their life-satisfaction
levels and on many other aspects of themselves and their lives. The data are from
repeated surveys, collected annually, for 27 countries from 1980 to 2011. For each
nation, and each year, total advertising expenditure levels are also gathered (details
are given later in Materials and Methods). We then match one set of data with
the other. To adjust in the analysis for possible confounding factors, we use re-
gression analysis, and examines estimates from xed-e¤ects equations in which the
unobservable characteristics of nations can be held constant. Intuitively, this study
thus examines how the change in advertising in a country is correlated with the later
change in life-satisfaction levels in that country. None of the papers results depend
on elementary cross-sectional regression equations.
4.2 Materials and Methods
For this paper, data are taken from three di¤erent sources: the Eurobarometer Sur-
vey, ZenithOptimedia, and theWorld Bank. The Eurobarometer survey, which began
in 1972, is a set of public opinion surveys conducted on behalf of the European Com-
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mission. Each spring and autumn, face-to-face interviews are conducted for a new
sample of residents of European Union (EU) Member States (around 1000 per coun-
try). The questions that respondents are asked are varied and include items intended
to assess life satisfaction, to elicit opinions about the state of politics in Europe, to
gain insight into perceptions of political institutions, etc. The data recorded in the
Eurobarometer are used by the European Commission to monitor the evolution of
public opinion and ultimately to aid in decision making.
For this study, data are gathered from individuals from 27 countries over the years
1980 to 2011. Specically, data are available on the following transition European
countries4: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Turkey, and on the following non-
transition countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. The survey
contains information on individual demographics, such as age, gender, education,
marital status, employment status, and household size, as well as life satisfaction in-
dicators. In particular, the survey asks On the whole, are you very satised, fairly
satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead?. Answers to
this question are available for every year except 1996.
Annual country total advertising expenditure data are available from ZenithOp-
timedia, which is a global media services company. They publish a quarterly report
(the Advertising Expenditure Forecasts) that covers advertising from a large num-
ber of markets around the world. This record contains the total amount spent on
advertising in the country historically as well as forecasts for the future. Here histor-
ical data are used from 1980 to 2011, as reported in the issue Advertising Expen-
diture Forecasts of December 2013.Further details are available in the Advertising
Expenditure Forecasts of ZenithOptimedia (Austin et al., 2013).
Macroeconomic indicators are taken from the World Bank. In particular, data
are available by country for the years 1980 to 2011 on GDP, GDP per capita, and the
national unemployment rate. These are published in World Development Indicators.
Information is combined from all three data sources for the same 27 countries and
time periods (1980-2011). The nal sample-size for the current study consists of a
little over 900,000 observations on randomly sampled European citizens. Table 4.1
presents some descriptive statistics of our sample. It can be seen that our respondents
are on average above 44 years old and come from a household approximatively 3
persons. There are slightly less men than women in our sample (47% of men, 53% of
women). The considered countries appear to be di¤erent in term of macroeconomics
variable. The lowest unemployement rate from our sample is 2:5% in the Netherlands
in 2001 and the highest 24% in Spain in 1994. GDP per capita also vary, going from
USD 3; 553 (Bulgaria, 2004) to almost USD 54; 600 (Norway, 1996).
The data are used to estimate coe¢ cients from linear regression models,5 where
4Transition countries are countries whose economies are changing from centrally planned
economies into market economies. The classication is made according to the International Mone-
tary Fund (http://www.imf.org/).
5Using ordinal or cardinal regressions do not a¤ect the results.
CHAPTER 4. ADVERTISING AND LIFE SATISFACTION 84
Table 4.1: Descriptive Satistics of our Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Demographics
Age 44.675 18.161 15 99 1321739
Married 0.612 0.487 0 1 1252627
Male 0.473 0.499 0 1 1353045
Size of the household 2.903 1.491 1 9 1181314
Age Completed Education
Up to 14 0.214 0.41 0 1 1239393
15-19 0.463 0.499 0 1 1239393
20 or older 0.229 0.42 0 1 1239393
Macroecomics Variables
Unemployment Rate (%) 8.875 3.818 2.5 23.9 1295463
GDP per Capita 1 27988 10590 3554 54599 1330368
1 GDP per capita is measured in 2005 constant USD.
robust clustered standard errors are computed to account for the fact that the er-
rors may be correlated within countries. Life satisfaction scores are regressed on a
variety of control variables as detailed below. Specically, the main equation that is
estimated is
LSijt =  + AdvExpjt + Demoijt +  Macrojt + j + t + ijt;
where i denotes an individual, j a country, and t a year. The variable LSijt is
reported life satisfaction, AdvExpjt represents advertising expenditures (measured,
in turn, as the lag of natural logarithm of total advertising expenditure and as the
sum of three previous lags of natural logarithm of total advertising expenditures),
the vector Demoijt contains individual demographic characteristics (age, education,
gender, etc.), and Macrojt is a vector of macroeconomic variables that may impact
life satisfaction, such as the lag of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate. To
control for common country and year attributes, the statistical analysis allows for
country j and time t xed e¤ects. The ijt term captures an individual, country,
year specic error. A number of di¤erent specications are estimated as robustness
checks.
4.3 Results
Figure 4.1 is an illustration of the studys key idea. The gure divides the data into
tertiles and then plots the (uncorrected) relationship between the change in advertis-
ing and the change in life satisfaction. The three vertical bars separate the data into
countries that over our period of study had particularly large increases in advertising
expenditure, moderate increases, and small increases. Figure 4.1 demonstrates that
the greater is the rise in advertising, the smaller is the rise in life satisfaction. It is
based on our sample of approximately 1 million individuals over the years 1980 to
2011.6
Regression analyses reported in Table 4.2 provide evidence of a more formal kind.
6Or for shorter periods where full data are not available for a particular country.
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Table 4.2: OLS Regressions of Life Satisfaction on Advertising Expenditure (27
countries, 1980- 2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Demographics
Age -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.382 -0.385 -0.385 -0.385 -0.385 -0.385 -0.386 -0.386 -0.385
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Married 0.170 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.170 0.172
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Size of the Household 0.0046 0.0047 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age when Completed Education
Up to 14 -0.227 -0.227 -0.229 -0.227 -0.227 -0.229 -0.226 -0.226 -0.229
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Between 15 and 19 -0.156 -0.156 -0.157 -0.157 -0.156 -0.157 -0.155 -0.155 -0.157
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Older than 20 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Macroeconomic Variables
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log GDP per Capita 0.134 0.234 0.297 0.398 0.415 0.517 0.432 0.388 0.454
(0.105) (0.121) (0.138) (0.216) (0.231) (0.228) (0.178) (0.190) (0.191)
Log 1st Lag GDP per Capita -0.278 -0.182 -0.229 -0.087 0.313 0.209
(0.184) (0.198) (0.203) (0.200) (0.208) (0.186)
Log 2nd Lag GDP per Capita -0.225 -0.431 -0.360
(0.218) (0.213) (0.209)
First Lag of Adv Expenditure
Log Total Adv Expenditure -0.069 -0.067 -0.085
(0.028) (0.028) (0.036)
Sum of Adv Expenditure (1st to 3rd lags)
Sum of Log Adv Expenditure -0.097 -0.092 -0.094
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.177 1.638 1.328 2.327 1.628 1.372 2.384 1.422 1.232
(1.066) (1.138) (1.241) (1.094) (1.126) (1.224) (1.150) (1.242) (1.227)
N 760,252 742,497 683,551 742,497 742,497 683,551 717,441 717,441 683,551
adj. R2 0.214 0.213 0.215 0.213 0.213 0.215 0.213 0.214 0.215
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters: 27. All regressions include year and country
dummies (base line country is Austria). Dependent variable: reported life satisfaction. The exact question is: "On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not
very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead". The overall mean of the dependent variable is 2.98. Natural logarithm of GDP per capita and lagged advertising
expenditures is used. Advertising expenditures are in constant 2005 million USD and GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.
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Figure 4.1: Changes in Advertising and Changes in the Life Satisfaction of Countries
They show the same pattern. In column 1 of Table 4.2, the now-standard statistical
specication for national happiness equations (see, for example, Di Tella et al., 2001;
Di Tella et al., 2003; Radcli¤, 2013) ts the data in the conventional way. A variable
for the persons age enters with the quadratic form that is commonly found in the
well-being literature; being married and highly educated are both associated with
greater satisfaction with life; being unemployed is associated with low levels of life
satisfaction; the unemployment rate in the country enters negatively; GDP is positive
but statistically weak.
Columns 2 to 9 of Table 4.2 reveal links between life-satisfaction scores in the
current period with past advertising levels. Table 4.2 shows what happens when
advertising variables are included within the regression equation, where columns 4
and 7 give the base results without advertising included. In each case, the advertising
variables enter negatively, with small standard errors (this is after adjustment for
potential biases from clustering). In column 2, for example, the coe¢ cient on the
logarithm of advertising expenditure is  0:069 with a standard error of 0:028. This
variable is for advertising lagged one period. In column 3, the coe¢ cient on the stock
of advertising (measured as the sum of advertising expenditures over three previous
years, again in logarithms) is  0:097 with a standard error of 0:036.
There is a natural potential criticism of the regression equations in the second
and third columns of Table 4.2. It is that an advertising variable might in some way
be erroneously standing in for earlier business-cycle movements. The later columns
of Table 4.2 probe that possibility. In each case, however, the key result is robust.
The most general specications are in columns 8 and 9 of Table 4.2, but even with
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three GDP per-capita terms included (that is, current GDP and two variables for
lagged GDP in each of the two prior years) the advertising variables continue to
be statistically signicant and of similar size to that in earlier columns. Hence
the advertising variables are not creating a spurious association that is attributable
merely to the state of the business cycle in any particular year or country.
One feature of Table 4.2 is that the e¤ects from GDP tends to become some-
what larger after the inclusion of the advertising variables (for example, in column 2
compared to column 1). This is consistent with the hypothesis that, although rises
in GDP tend to be benecial, the benets of economic growth may be somewhat
o¤set by a rise in advertising expenditure. Following the tradition in much of the
literature on the economics of advertising (Bain, 1956; Bagwell, 2001), Table 4.2 also
uses a variable for the stock of advertising. This is designed to capture the idea that
commercial organizations spend money on advertising to build up a lasting brand in
the minds of their consumers.
It may be useful to emphasize that the results reported here include the following
covariates: age, whether unemployed, whether married, whether male, size of family,
level of education, the unemployment rate in the country, and GDP-per-capita in
the country. Throughout the papers tables, variables for country dummies and
year dummies are included. These covariates are the standard ones in the modern
literature on the social science of well-being. However, unlike previous longitudinal
studies of national well-being, the data set has the advantage that it allows us to
incorporate measures of advertising expenditure for each country and year.
In Table 4.3, which explores a range of lag lengths, the robustness of the original
result is evident: rises in advertising are precursors to declines in well-being. The
size of the predictive power of advertising on later life-satisfaction depends on the
time lag between the two variables. Longer lags, as in the right-hand columns of
Table 4.3, are associated with more-negative estimates.
In these tables the estimated advertising e¤ect-size is substantial. For column
3 of Table 4.2, for example, the coe¢ cient on the stock of advertising is  0:097.
Because this variable is in logarithms, the percentage change of life satisfaction with
respect to the percentage change in (the stock of) advertising is approximately  0:03
(this calculation uses the fact that the mean of life satisfaction is 2:98, which has
to be used to divide the number  0:097), and  0:03 can thus be thought of as the
long-run elasticity of national well-being with respect to advertising spending. This
implies that a hypothetical doubling of advertising expenditure would result in a 3
percent drop in life satisfaction. Around the mean of 2:98, therefore, that would be
a fall of 0.09 life satisfaction points when measured on the one to four scale used in
the Eurobarometer Surveys. That is considerable. It is approximately one half the
absolute size of the marriage e¤ect on life satisfaction, or approximately one quarter
of the absolute size of the e¤ect of being unemployed (the coe¢ cient on marriage is
0:17 and that on unemployment is  0:38).
Table 4.4 the summarizes the levels of advertising expenditure for the di¤erent
nations. On average, countries spend just under 1% of GDP in this way. Table 4.5
presents results for xed-e¤ects models in which the kind of advertising expenditure
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Table 4.3: OLS Regressions of Life Satisfaction on Various Lagged Advertising Ex-
penditure (27 countries, 1980-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.382 -0.385 -0.386 -0.385
(0.0278) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Married 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.171
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Size of the Household 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age when Completed Education
Up to 14 -0.227 -0.227 -0.226 -0.229
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Between 15 and 19 -0.156 -0.156 -0.155 -0.157
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Older than 20 -0.030 -0.030 -0.028 -0.030
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Macroeconomic Variables
Log GDP per Capita 0.213 0.234 0.264 0.296
(0.115) (0.121) (0.127) (0.132)
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log of Adv Expenditure
Log Total Adv Expenditure -0.051
(0.029)
Log 1st Total Adv Expenditure -0.069
(0.028)
Log 2nd Lag Total Adv Expenditure -0.085
(0.028)
Log 3rd Total Adv Expenditure -0.094
(0.031)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.738 1.638 1.485 1.195
(1.095) (1.138) (1.201) (1.226)
N 760252 742497 717441 683551
adj. R2 0.214 0.213 0.214 0.215
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in
parentheses. Number of clusters: 27. All regressions include year and country dummies (base
line country is Austria). Dependent variable: reported life satisfaction. The exact question is:
"On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with
the life you lead". The overall mean of the dependent variable is 2.98. Natural logarithm of GDP
per capita and lagged advertising expenditures is used. Advertising expenditures are in constant
2005 million USD and GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.
CHAPTER 4. ADVERTISING AND LIFE SATISFACTION 89
Table 4.4: Advertising Expenditure as % of GDP and Per-Capita
Adv Exp as Ad Exp
Country % of GDP per Capita
Austria 0.822 297.682
Belgium 0.590 191.633
Bulgaria 1.425 63.014
Croatia 2.087 224.648
Czech Republic 0.549 79.078
Germany (after 1989) 0.852 277.089
Denmark 0.804 331.678
Estonia 0.037 4.025
Finland 0.750 253.400
France 0.591 177.633
Greece 0.802 147.355
Hungary 0.746 83.254
Ireland 0.374 126.301
Italy 0.426 191.633
Lithuania 0.446 38.557
Latvia 0.496 38.553
Netherlands 0.737 257.164
Norway 0.454 226.266
Poland 0.585 53.950
Portugal 0.473 80.912
Romania 0.119 6.617
Spain 0.828 178.838
Sweden 0.677 260.986
Slovenia 0.006 1.194
Slovakia 0.849 114.504
Turkey 0.314 23.551
UK 0.911 288.355
Total 0.683 195.003
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Table 4.5: OLS Regressions of Life-Satisfaction on Disaggregated Advertising Ex-
penditure (27 countries, 1980-2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.387 -0.385 -0.382 -0.381
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Married 0.171 0.171 0.178 0.178
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Size of the Household 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age when Completed Education
Up to 14 -0.229 -0.229 -0.228 -0.228
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Between 15 and 19 -0.157 -0.157 -0.159 -0.159
(0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022)
Older than 20 -0.030 -0.030 -0.035 -0.034
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Macroeconomic Variables
Log GDP per Capita 0.413 0.297 0.409 0.408
(0.080) (0.138) (0.123) (0.210)
Country in Transition 0.268 0.133 0.132 0.133
(0.130) (0.194) (0.230) (0.329)
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.006 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock of Adv Expenditure
Sum of Log Adv Expenditure -0.118 -0.0966
(0.032) (0.036)
Sum of Log Newspaper Adv Expenditure -0.080 -0.080
(0.033) (0.035)
Sum of Log Magazines Adv Expenditure -0.053 -0.053
(0.029) (0.030)
Sum of Log TV Adv Expenditure 0.051 0.050
(0.033) (0.035)
Sum of Log Radio Adv Expenditure 0.003 0.003
(0.020) (0.019)
Sum of Log Cinema Adv Expenditure 0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.024)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.292 1.328 -0.017 -0.009
(0.715) (1.241) (1.175) (1.993)
N 686139 683551 572226 569638
adj. R2 0.215 0.215 0.207 0.208
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses.
Number of clusters: 27. All regressions include year and country dummies (base line country is
Austria). Dependent variable: reported life satisfaction. The exact question is: "On the whole, are
you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead".
The overall mean of the dependent variable is 2.98. Natural logarithm of GDP per capita and lagged
advertising expenditures is used. Advertising expenditures are in constant 2005 million USD and
GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.
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Table 4.6: OLS Regressions of Life-Satisfaction for 12 Non-Transitory Countries from
1980 to 1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
satis satis satis satis satis satis satis satis satis
Demographics
Age -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.403 -0.405 -0.397 -0.405 -0.405 -0.397 -0.404 -0.404 -0.397
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Married 0.161 0.161 0.163 0.161 0.161 0.163 0.161 0.161 0.163
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Male -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.0231 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Size of the Household 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.00178 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age when Completed Education
Up to 14 -0.191 -0.190 -0.198 -0.191 -0.191 -0.199 -0.191 -0.191 -0.199
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Between 15 and 19 -0.113 -0.114 -0.121 -0.114 -0.114 -0.121 -0.115 -0.115 -0.121
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Older than 20 -0.025 -0.026 -0.029 -0.026 -0.026 -0.0286 -0.025 -0.025 -0.029
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Macroeconomic Variables
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.00538 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) ((0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Log GDP per Capita 0.705 0.680 0.830 1.146 1.086 1.142 1.102 0.978 0.890
(0.168) (0.152) (0.209) (0.335) (0.372) (0.489) (0.386) (0.384) (0.410)
Log 1st Lag GDP per Capita -0.541 -0.449 -0.359 -0.0256 0.214 0.438
(0.434) (0.438) (0.540) (0.492) (0.480) (0.431)
Log 2nd Lag GDP per Capita -0.446 -0.560 -0.592
(0.134) (0.151) (0.140)
First Lag of Adv Expenditure
Log Total Adv Expenditure -0.059 -0.053 -0.070
(0.028) (0.031) (0.042)
Sum of Adv Expenditure (1st to 3rd lags)
Sum of Log Adv Expenditure -0.028 -0.025 -0.028
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -3.618 -2.984 -4.619 -2.607 -2.583 -4.162 -2.800 -2.354 -3.672
(1.704) (1.528) (2.120) (2.208) (1.810) (2.460) (2.637) (2.133) (2.703)
N 319796 313985 278594 313985 313985 278594 300709 300709 278594
adj. R2 0.164 0.163 0.166 0.163 0.163 0.166 0.164 0.164 0.166
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters: 12. All regressions include year and country
dummies (base line country is Belgium). Dependent variable: reported life satisfaction. The exact question is: "On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised,
not very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead". The overall mean of the dependent variable is 3.04. Natural logarithm of GDP per capita and lagged
advertising expenditures is used. Advertising expenditures are in constant 2005 million USD and GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.
CHAPTER 4. ADVERTISING AND LIFE SATISFACTION 92
Table 4.7: OLS Regressions of Life-Satisfaction for 14 Non-Transitory Countries from
1996 to 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
satis satis satis satis satis satis satis satis satis
Demographics
Age -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Married 0.181 0.181 0.182 0.181 0.182 0.182 0.181 0.182 0.182
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Male -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Size of the Household 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age when Completed Education
Up to 14 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 -0.254
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Between 15 and 19 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Older than 20 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 -0.0277 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Macroeconomic Variables
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log GDP per Capita 0.341 0.469 0.547 0.871 0.859 0.775 0.776 0.786 0.774
(0.435) (0.489) (0.449) (0.566) (0.569) (0.555) (0.480) (0.481) (0.472)
Log 1st Lag GDP per Capita -0.548 -0.465 -0.269 -0.192 -0.198 -0.265
(0.695) (0.811) (0.811) (0.608) (0.598) (0.582)
Log 2nd Lag GDP per Capita -0.256 -0.205 -0.003
(0.388) (0.439) (0.526)
First Lag of Adv Expenditure
Log Total Adv Expenditure -0.062 -0.033 -0.026
(0.104) (0.116) (0.121)
Sum of Adv Expenditure (1st to 3rd lags)
Sum of Log Adv Expenditure -0.115 -0.097 -0.097
(0.119) (0.132) (0.145)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.082 -0.940 -1.243 0.078 -0.411 -0.982 0.020 -0.352 -0.981
(4.563) (4.767) (4.339) (4.818) (5.526) (4.986) (4.817) (5.569) (5.044)
N 280362 280362 280362 280362 280362 280362 280362 280362 280362
adj. R2 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.221
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters: 14. All regressions include year and country
dummies (base line country is Austria). Dependent variable: reported life satisfaction. The exact question is: "On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not
very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead". The overall mean of the dependent variable is 3.07. Natural logarithm of GDP per capita and lagged advertising
expenditures is used. Advertising expenditures are in constant 2005 million USD and GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.
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Table 4.8: Reverse Causality - Log Total-Advertising Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advertising Last Period
Log of Total Adv Exp Last Period 0.824 0.813 0.943 0.944 0.966 0.941 0.940 0.941
(0.077) (0.072) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
Macroeconomic Variables
Unemployment Rate in the Country -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.00741 -0.00786 -0.00749
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log GDP per Capita 1.865 1.879 1.833 1.833 1.764 1.788 1.771 1.766
(0.258) (0.268) (0.258) (0.274) (0.270) (0.284) (0.280) (0.292)
Log 1st Lag GDP per Capita -1.637 -1.610 -1.820 -1.809 -1.713 -1.543 -1.550 -1.497
(0.314) (0.310) (0.272) (0.275) (0.368) (0.375) (0.377) (0.374)
Log 2nd Lag GDP per Capita -0.120 -0.235 -0.202 -0.242
(0.198) (0.193) (0.196) (0.218)
Mean Satisfaction
Current Mean Satisfaction -0.018 0.038
(0.105) (0.075)
1st Lag Mean Satisfaction 0.013 -0.002
(0.067) (0.042)
2nd Lag Mean Satisfaction -0.043 -0.037
(0.055) (0.056)
3rd Lag Mean Satisfaction 0.040 0.054
(0.053) (0.052)
Fixed E¤ects
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.968 -1.392 0.520 0.169 0.950 0.424 0.459 0.103
(1.539) (1.267) (0.866) (0.749) (1.394) (0.955) (0.877) (0.767)
N 438 435 412 389 416 416 412 389
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001. Clustered (by country) robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of clusters: 27. All regressions include year and
country dummies (base line country is Austria). Dependent variable: log of total advertising expenditure (in constant 2005 million USD). Mean satisfaction is
the average of reported life satisfaction by year and country. GDP is per capita in constant 2005 USD.
is disaggregated into ve di¤erent categories (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, and
cinema).It is the rst two kinds that exhibit large and signicant negatives. Tables
4.6 and 4.7 show that, dividing the data period into two halves for the non-transition
countries, the coe¢ cient on advertising is fairly stable across time. This is a check
on robustness. Importantly, all twelve of the coe¢ cients, across the two tables, are
negative. In Table 4.6 the advertising coe¢ cient is approximately -0.06, and in Table
4.7 it averages to a similar size (though is somewhat smaller for lagged advertising
and bigger for the stock of advertising). Standard errors, of course, are inevitably
larger than for the full sample of thirty years taken as a whole; the appropriate test
is instead for stability in coe¢ cient sizes.
We also check, in the spirit of Granger-causality tests (Granger, 1969), for possible
reverse linkages. Table 4.8 reveals no evidence that lagged values of life satisfaction
have predictive power in an advertising equation.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper has explored a long-debated question in social science: how is the well-
being of a nation a¤ected by advertising? It is the rst empirical study of its kind.
The papers results are consistent with conceptual concerns expressed more than a
century ago by authors such as Veblen (1904) and Robinson (1933); they are poten-
tially consistent with arguments made in later writings such as by Easterlin (2003)
and Layard (1980); they may also be consistent with ideas about the deleterious con-
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sequences of materialism (Sirgy et al., 2012; Burroughs and Rindeisch, 2002; Speck
and Roy, 2008; Snyder and Debono, 1985). Rises and falls in advertising expenditure
in Europes nations have been shown here to be followed by falls and rises in life-
satisfaction levels. There is evidence for a longitudinal relationship between national
advertising and national dissatisfaction. The estimated e¤ect-size is substantial and
not merely statistically well-determined.
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